Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00457Metadata
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La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 2002. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation. The Journal of Finance 57, no. 3: 1147–1170. doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00457.Abstract
Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. A common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.Terms of Use
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http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:30747191
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