Walking the Talk in Multiparty Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation

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Walking the Talk in Multiparty Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation

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Title: Walking the Talk in Multiparty Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation
Author: McGinn, Kathleen L.; Milkman, Katherine L.; Noth, Markus

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Citation: McGinn, Kathleen L., Katherine L. Milkman, and Markus Noth. "Walking the Talk in Multiparty Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation." Journal of Economic Psychology 33, no. 1 (February 2012).
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Abstract: We study the framing effects of communication on payoffs in multiparty bargaining. Communication has been shown to be more truthful and revealing than predicted in equilibrium. Because talk is preference-revealing, it may effectively frame bargaining around a logic of fairness or competition, moving parties on a path toward or away from equal-division agreements. These endogenous framing effects may outweigh any overall social utility effects due to the mere presence of communication. In two studies, we find that non-binding talk about fairness within a three-party, complete-information game leads toward off-equilibrium, equal division payoffs, while non-binding talk focusing on Competitive Reasoning moves parties away from equal divisions. Our two studies allow us to demonstrate that manipulated pre-game talk and spontaneous within-game dialogue lead to the same results.
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2011.10.008
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9346337

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