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Schizophrenic hallucinations were studied with regard to their phenomenology. A comparison was made with the "model psychoses"-sleep, hallucinogen psychosis, amphetamine psychosis, and the organic psychoses (especially temporal lobe epilepsy). The dopamine theory of schizophrenia was presented, and then the author's own hypothesis for a neurophysiological mechanism for schizophrenic hallucinations was introduced. This hypothesis is an attempt to explain both the etiology and pathogenesis of schizophrenia. It is based on the dopamine theory, and in particular the mesolimbic (A10) dopamine system. Electrical brain stimulation studies, which evoke experiential hallucinations, along with experimental results showing that these hallucinations are dependent upon the subject's psychological state have caused the author to label this phenomenon contextual hallucinations. Recently, dopamine nerve terminals have been discovered in the limbic cortex and it is known that the neuroleptic drugs antipsychotic effects are in the mesolimbic dopamine system. These findings have led the author to propose that schizophrenic hallucinations are very similar to contextual hallucinations and they are elicited by an improper balance of dopamine in the mesolimbic system. It is thought that stress might psychosocially activate this mechanism. The author also suggests that the additional symptoms of schizophrenia are secondary and peripheral to hallucinations.

Private-sector development finance institutions (DFIs) have been asked over the past decade to scale climate finance dramatically while maintaining their traditional development mandate. The two objectives are linked but not the same, and little is known about how the institutions delivering both manage the trade-offs between them. This paper asks whether the two mandates are compatible in practice, what DFIs are doing to manage the tension, and what governance would make it more likely that they reinforce rather than displace each other. It draws on analysis of climate and development finance flows and on interviews with senior executives at seven bilateral DFIs and EBRD, alongside development finance experts.

The central finding is that the balance between the two mandates is unmanaged, struck by political instinct and institutional habit, and that the resulting incentives favor climate deals in richer markets over development deals in poorer ones. Climate mandates are set by shareholders without analysis and loosely specified, and a third mandate, the national interest, is now emerging through informal shareholder pressure. Rapid growth in climate investment has concentrated portfolios in energy and mitigation, while emitting but development-critical industries such as cement and steel have become harder to finance. Upper-middle-income countries take a larger share of DFIs' climate finance than of their other investment, and the private capital DFIs mobilize is more skewed still, because they typically mobilize less than 0.50 per dollar invested in low-income countries against more than 1 dollar in middle-income ones. The drive to mobilize is also misallocating concessional capital and turning DFIs into merchant banks, originating assets to sell them on.

DFIs are responding with portfolio floors, carbon-intensity budgets and structural separation, largely without direction from their shareholders. For DFI boards, the paper recommends deal-level tools to weigh climate against development, transition-finance frameworks for emitting sectors, more disciplined use of concessional capital, resilience screening across the whole portfolio, and structural separation of the two mandates where shareholders are aligned. For shareholders, it recommends setting the climate-development balance through analysis, not political negotiation, floors for low-income and least developed countries, new capital behind new climate commitments, and mobilization measured for quality, not volume alone. Taken together, these would put the balance between climate and development under active management.

Answering the Call is a collection of seven short stories set in the 2020s that explores the central theme of being seen. The pieces look at what people try to hide of themselves, be it a secret wish, an emotion, love, power, authenticity, or desire in order to maintain the status quo or because of their own limiting beliefs. In each story these characters are (consciously or not) on a quest for authenticity and healing transformation. These transformations bring in elements of the unseen, invisible, or spiritual worlds that exist alongside the physical one. While most of these stories take place in modern day reality, they each have a fairy tale quality, and the collection ends with a tale about how an entire city reacts when the citizens want to see something that remains a mystery to them. Does being seen/unseen protect, harm, or both? That is one of the many questions hidden within this collection—what other questions might you see? What answers will you find?

There are few concepts in international relations that are of more consequence, and yet more amorphous, than power. In the struggle for mastery among the great powers – on and off the battlefield – this study seeks to shed new light on the measurement, nature, and exercise of power since the introduction of the modern state system four centuries ago. The contributions and findings can be distilled as follows.

In utilizing recently developed data sets and new proxies for state power over a longer period than comparable studies, I put different measures of power to the test and find striking differences in their ability to predict war and dispute outcomes. Of particular significance, many of the representations of raw or gross might that are intuitively appealing and ubiquitous in international relations scholarship – like gross domestic product, the composite indicator of national material capability, military spending, and the size of the armed forces – are shown to perform no better than a coin toss in predicting the outcomes of great power conflicts. These results pose a challenge to the large body of analysis that emphasizes measures of raw might as rough but reliable guides to power and influence in the international arena. By contrast, measures of latent capability I refer to as ‘dual use power’ (spanning technology, trade, and finance) have accurately foreshadowed the outcome of around 80 per cent of great power conflicts.

In a case study of cycles and transitions in hegemonic power based on a novel systematic dating exercise, I also identify several stylized facts when breaking national capability down into its key elements. First, while dominant states have often enjoyed lengthy leadership cycles in individual sources of power lasting well over a century, periods of simultaneous leadership in these dimensions of power have been much shorter at around seven decades. Second, power transitions are best conceptualized as multi-stage phenomena rather than a singular cross-over event. Third, a peak in relative power rarely portends an imminent power transition. Fourth, global leadership in sea power is an early-cycle marker of hegemonic ascendency. And fifth, global leadership in finance and technology is typically more enduring than for trade, which could partly reflect stronger network effects in the former.

In concluding with a review of the limits of material power and predatory coercion, I argue that while the ability and willingness of the pre-eminent state to shape the international system differed across three hegemonic eras – Dutch, British, and American – each sought to make key tenants of the international order tolerable or attractive to a sufficiently large cohort of states that it boosted their influence beyond that possible by their material resource advantage alone.

As a new era of great power contestation dawns where competition is intensifying across a range of domains, the results in this study should be of more than historical interest. I conclude with several implications pertaining to the dynamics of power transitions, the integration of different elements of national power, and the conduct of modern economic statecraft incorporating dual use power.

Building on literature that suggests that there are both benefits (e.g., increased empathy and social cognition) and risks (e.g., psychological discomfort during or after emotionally intense practices) related to the practice of acting, this study addresses a gap in psychology research by investigating cognitive control and emotion regulation processes that could be involved in creating emotional states in acting. Using a mixed-methods design, this project aims to examine whether “inside-out” acting training is associated with interoceptive awareness, emotion regulation, and theory of mind, as well as with any potential short- and long-term unwanted psychological discomfort felt by actors. The study is divided into quantitative and qualitative parts. In the quantitative phase, participants completed the Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA) questionnaire, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET), the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ), and a modified version of the ERQ. As the original ERQ tests for the ability to down-regulate emotions, and I hypothesized that up-regulation would be used in acting, the modified ERQ contained questions that were inverted to inquire about up-regulation in acting contexts. Analyses examined associations between acting experience (class level and years of study) and these measures. The primary finding was that the MAIA total score increased significantly with both class level (F(2, 65) = 49.03, p .001) and years of study (F(4, 63) = 46.26, p .001), after Bonferroni, whereas the RMET and ERQ measures did not show significant associations. These results suggest that interoceptive awareness may increase with acting training, while other measured scales either may not be sensitive to acting training or may not be the appropriate measures, due to limitations such as the ceiling effect. In the qualitative phase, phenomenological interviews were conducted to help understand the findings of the quantitative phase. The participants were ten professional actors (ages 27–81) with training in inside-out techniques, all of whom had more than ten years of experience, representing multiple approaches (such as Method Acting, Meisner, Stella Adler, Uta Hagen, and mixed methods). Actors described multiple pathways to triggering emotional states (such as autobiographical memory, imagined future outcomes for the self, and imagined memories/futures for the character), and reported somatic sensations as markers of emotional arousal. They also reported that emotions could arise when they focused on the character's responses to circumstances, objectives, relationships, and environment, but less so when they consciously strived for a specific emotional state, suggesting that a loosening of top-down control may facilitate emotional experience during acting. Together, the mixed-method findings suggest that acting may cultivate interoceptive awareness and that actors rely on a number of personally tailored strategies to alter their emotional states, which could be better understood through future research controlling for specific acting techniques and situational contexts.