Person:

Kelman, Herbert

Acts of torture are conceptualized as crimes of obedience, which are inevitably linked to crimes at higher levels of the hierarchy, where orders are issued, policy is formulated, and the atmosphere conducive to acts of torture is created. The present analysis suggests several conditions under which torture becomes an instrument of State policy and the authority structure of the State is fully utilized to implement that policy: the perception by State authorities that the security of the State is under severe threat — which, at the macro-level, can justify torture and, at the micro-level, contribute to its authorization; the existence of an elaborate and powerful apparatus charged with protecting the security of the State — which, at the macro-level, may lead to the recruitment and training of professional torturers as part of that apparatus and, at the micro-level, contribute to the routinization of torture; and the existence of disaffected ethnic, religious, political, or other groups within (or under the control) of the State that do not enjoy full citizenship rights — which, at the macro-level, may lead to their designation as enemies of the State and appropriate targets for torture and, at the micro-level, their dehumanization.

Genocide, mass killing, torture, ethnic cleansing, and other gross violations of human rights are defined as war crimes or crimes against humanity under international law. To develop an adequate explanation of such actions, which is the task of social psychology, and an adequate legal response to them, which is the task of international law, requires going beyond the characteristics of individual perpetrators or even of the situations in which these practices take place. It requires close examination of the political system and of the policy process in which these actions are embedded and that provide the larger context for them.

The vicissitudes of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since 1967 are analyzed using attitudes and related concepts where relevant. The 1967 war returned the two peoples' zero-sum conflict around national identity to its origin as a conflict within the land both peoples claim. Gradually, new attitudes evolved regarding the necessity and possibility of negotiations toward a two-state solution based on mutual recognition, which became the building stones of the 1993 Oslo agreement. Lacking a commitment to a final outcome, the Oslo-based peace process was hampered by reserve options, which increased avoidance at the expense of approach tendencies as the parties moved toward a final agreement. The resulting breakdown of the process in 2000 produced clashing narratives, reflecting different anchors for judgment and classical mirror images. Public support for violence increased, even as public opinion continued to favor a negotiated two-state solution. Reviving the peace process requires mutual reassurance about the availability of a partner for negotiating a principled peace based on a historic compromise that meets the basic needs and validates the identities of both peoples.

The interactions between identity groups engaged in a protracted conflict lack the conditions postulated by Gordon Allport in The Nature of Prejudice (1954) as necessary if contact is to reduce intergroup prejudice. The article examines the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from this perspective. After summarizing the history of the conflict, it proposes that a long-term resolution of the conflict requires development of a transcendent identity for the two peoples that does not threaten the particularistic identity of each. The nature of the conflict, however impedes the development of a transcendent identity by creating a state of negative! interdependence between the two identities such that asserting one group's identity requires negating the identity of the other. The resulting threat to each group's identity is further exacerbated by the fact that each side perceives the other as a source of some of its own negative identity elements, especially a view of the self as victim and as victimizer. The article concludes with a discussion of ways of overcoming the negative interdependence of the two identities by drawing on some of the positive elements in the relationship, most notably the positive interdependence between the two groups that exists in reality. Problem-solving workshops represent one setting for equal-status interactions that provide the parties the opportunity to "negotiate " their identities and to find ways of accommodating the identity of the other in their own identity.

Since the original goals of Zionism have largely been accomplished or are less relevant today, conditions are ripe for Israel's transition from Zionism to post-Zionism. A post-Zionist Israel-while maintaining its Jewish character and special relationship to world Jewry-would be a state primarily committed to protecting and advancing the interests of its citizens, regardless of ethnicity. In a post-Zionist Israel, the status of non-Jewish Israelis would be upgraded and the status of non-Israeli Jews downgraded. Moreover, Israel would be integrated into the region and engaged in normal, peaceful relations with its neighbors. Many forces are promoting this transition, including the peace process, changes in Israel-Diaspora relations, and the liberalization of the society. Countervailing forces stem mostly from the ultranationalist and Orthodox religious sectors in the society. To advance the transition, Israel will have to address four major divisions within the society: the divisions between citizens and noncitizens, Jewish and Palestinian citizens, Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews, and religious and secular Jews.

This article argues that the strictly pragmatic, step-by-step approach of Oslo has reached a dead end and that cajoling the parties into signing an agreement is now irrelevant. To move the peace process to a successful conclusion the parties must now commit themselves to a principled solution whose key elements include prior commitment to a genuine two-state solution as the endpoint of the final status negotiations, provision of meaningful citizenship to the Palestinians of the territories and the refugees, and mutual acknowledgment of the other's nationhood and humanity. Such a proposal, though seemingly utopian, represents the most realistic option at the present juncture.

This chapter begins with a summary of a model, developed half a century ago, that distinguishes three qualitatively different processes of social influence: compliance, identification, and internalization. The model, originally geared to and experimentally tested in the context of persuasive communication, was subsequently applied to influence in the context of long-term relationships, including psychotherapy, international exchanges, and the socialization of national/ethnic identity. It has been extended to analysis of the relationship of individuals to social systems. Individuals' rule, role, and value orientations to a system-conceptually linked to compliance, identification, and internalization-predict different reactions to their own violations of societal standards, different patterns of personal involvement in the political system, and differences in attitude toward authorities and readiness to obey. In a further extension of the model, three approaches to peacemaking in international or intergroup conflicts are identified-conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and reconciliation-which, respectively, focus on the accommodation of interests, relationships, and identities, and are conducive to changes at the level of compliance, identification, and internalization.