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Reinhart, Carmen

This paper explores the menu of options for renormalizing public debt levels relative to nominal activity in the long run, should governments eventually decide to do so. Although debt ratios may need to rise further in some cases, a vision of longer-term options is key to weighing alternative medium-term stabilization strategies. Orthodox ones, the standard fare of officialdom, include enhancing growth, running primary budget surpluses, and privatizing government assets. Heterodox polices include restructuring debt contracts, generating unexpected inflation, taxing wealth, and repressing private finance. Advanced countries have relied far more on heterodox approaches than many observers choose to remember.

The Federal Reserve's mandate has evolved considerably over the organization's hundred-year history. It was changed from an initial focus in 1913 on financial stability, to fiscal financing in World War II and its aftermath, to a strong anti-inflation focus from the late 1970s, and then back to greater emphasis on financial stability since the Great Contraction. Yet, as the Fed's mandate has expanded in recent years, its range of instruments has narrowed, partly based on a misguided belief in the inherent stability of financial markets. We argue for a return to multiple instruments, including a more active role for reserve requirements.

Lebanon’s current economic crisis ranks among the worst in recent history. GDP has collapsed by 38% in real terms. The Lebanese lira, which was fixed to the dollar in 1997, has lost more than 98% of its value on the parallel market. The government has defaulted on its debt, and depositors are unable to access their funds held at commercial banks. Consolidated public sector debt, including both government debt and commercial banks’ claims on the Banque du Liban (BdL), represents more than seven times the current GDP. Public services delivery has crumbled. In short, the country is undergoing a debt crisis, a banking crisis, a currency crisis, and a growth collapse. Four years into the crisis, a resolution remains elusive, and each passing day increases the economic and social burdens faced by the population.

Given the increasing cost of delaying a resolution, we propose a strategy for Lebanon’s economic recovery that addresses all the dimensions of the crisis while recognizing the need to rapidly kick-start the economic recovery.

Many emerging market economies are dollarized in varying degrees. How important is this for the conduct of monetary policy and choice of exchange rate regime? We propose a composite measure of dollarization, identify its major trends, and ascertain its impact on the effectiveness of monetary and exchange rate policy. We find that, contrary to the presumption in the literature, a high degree of dollarization does not pose an obstacle to monetary control or to disinflation. A high level of dollarization does appear to increase exchange rate pass-through, reinforcing the claim that "fear of floating" is a greater problem for highly dollarized economies.

Recent work has supported that there is a connection between domestic debt level and sovereign default on external debt. We examine the potential linkages in a case study of Venezuela from 1984 to 2013. This unique example encompasses multiple financial crises, cycles of liberalization and policy reversals, and alternative exchange rate arrangements. The Venezuelan experience reveals a nexus among domestic debt, financial repression, and external vulnerability. Unlike foreign currency-denominated debt, debt in domestic currency may be reduced through financial repression, a tax on bondholders and savers producing negative real interest rates. Using a variety of methodologies we estimate the magnitude of the tax from financial repression. On average, this financial repression tax (as a share of GDP) is similar to those of OECD economies, in spite of much higher domestic debt-to-GDP ratios in the latter. The financial repression "tax rate" is significantly higher in years of exchange controls and legislated interest rate ceilings. In line with earlier literature on capital controls, our comprehensive measures of capital flight document a link between domestic disequilibrium and a weakening of the net foreign asset position via private capital flight. We suggest these findings are not unique to the Venezuelan case.