Person:

Kosslyn, Stephen

Loading...
Profile Picture

Email Address

AA Acceptance Date

Birth Date

Research Projects

Organizational Units

Job Title

Last Name

Kosslyn

First Name

Stephen

Name

Kosslyn, Stephen

Search Results

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Publication

    Fear Selectively Modulates Visual Mental Imagery and Visual Perception

    (Taylor & Francis, 2010) Borst, Grégoire; Kosslyn, Stephen

    Emotions have been shown to modulate low-level visual processing of simple stimuli. In this study, we investigate whether emotions only modulate processing of visual representations created from direct visual inputs or whether they also modulate representations that underlie visual mental images. Our results demonstrate that when participants visualize or look at the global shape of written words (low-spatial-frequency visual information), the prior brief presentation of fearful faces enhances processing, whereas when participants visualize or look at details of written words (high-spatial-frequency visual information), the prior brief presentation of fearful faces impairs processing. This study demonstrates that emotions have similar effects on low-level processing of visual percepts and of internal representations created on the basis of information stored in long-term memory.

  • Publication

    Mental Rotation is Not Easily Cognitively Penetrable

    (Taylor & Francis, 2010-10-13) Borst, Grégoire; Kievit, Rogier A.; Thompson, William; Kosslyn, Stephen

    When participants take part in mental imagery experiments, are they using their "tacit knowledge" of perception to mimic what they believe should occur in the corresponding perceptual task? Two experiments were conducted to examine whether such an account can be applied to mental imagery in general. These experiments both examined tasks that required participants to "mentally rotate" stimuli. In Experiment 1, instructions led participants to believe that they could re-orient shapes in one step or avoid re-orienting the shapes altogether. Regardless of instruction type, response times increased linearly with increasing rotation angles. In Experiment 2, participants first observed novel objects rotating at different speeds, and then performed a mental rotation task with those objects. The speed of perceptually demonstrated rotation did not affect the speed of mental rotation. We argue that tacit knowledge cannot explain mental imagery results in general, and that in particular the mental rotation effect reflects the nature of the underlying internal representation and processes that transform it, rather than participants’ pre-existing knowledge.