Person:

Jensen, Anders

Exploiting a new global macro-historical database of effective tax rates, we uncover an intriguing pro-tax-capacity effect of international trade. While effective capital tax rates have fallen in developed countries, they have risen in developing countries since the mid-1990s. Event studies of trade liberalization shocks and instrumental variable regressions show that a significant share of this rise can be explained by trade integration, which increases the share of output produced in large corporations, where effective taxation of capital is higher. In contrast to a widely held view, globalization appears in many countries to have supported the ability of government to tax capital.

This paper studies the role of technology in local-government tax collection capacity in the developing world. We first conduct a new census of all local governments in Ghana to document a strong association between technology use and property tax billing, collection and enforcement. We then randomize the use of a new revenue collection technology within one large municipal government. Revenue collectors using the new technology delivered 27 percent more bills and collected 103 percent more tax revenues than control collectors. Collectors using the new technology learned faster about which households in their assigned areas were willing and able to make payments. We reconcile these experimental findings in a simple Beckerian time-use model in which technology allows revenue collectors to better allocate their time towards households that are the most likely to comply with taxpaying duties. The model's predictions are consistent with experimental evidence showing that treatment collectors are more likely to target households with greater liquidity, income, awareness of taxpaying duties, and satisfaction with local public goods provision.

Can taxes on consumption redistribute in developing countries? Contrary to consensus, we show that taxing consumption is progressive once we account for informal consumption. Using household expenditure surveys in 32 countries we proxy for informal consumption using the type of store where purchases occur. We find that the budget share spent in informal stores steeply declines with income, so that the effective tax rate of a broad consumption tax rises with income. Our findings imply that the widespread policy of exempting food from taxation cannot be justified on equity grounds in low income-countries

Can taxes on consumption redistribute in developing countries? Contrary to consensus, we show that taxing consumption is progressive once we account for informal consumption. Using household expenditure surveys in 32 countries we proxy for informal consumption using the type of store where purchases occur. We find that the budget share spent in informal stores steeply declines with income, so that the effective tax rate of a broad consumption tax rises with income. Our findings imply that the widespread policy of exempting food from taxation cannot be justified on equity grounds in lowincome-countries.