Person: Stein, Jeremy
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Stein
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Stein, Jeremy
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Publication Business Credit Programs in the Pandemic Era(2020-09) Hanson, Samuel; Stein, Jeremy; Sunderam, Aditya; Zwick, EricWe develop a pair of models that speak to the goals and design of the sort of business-lending and corporate-bond purchase programs that have been introduced by governments in response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. An overarching theme is that, in contrast to the classic lender-of-last-resort thinking that underpinned much of the response to the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, an effective policy response to the pandemic will require the government to accept the prospect of significant losses on credit extended to private sector firms.Publication A Quantity-Driven Theory of Term Premia and Exchange Rates(Oxford University Press (OUP), 2023-05-27) Greenwood, Robin; Hanson, Samuel; Stein, Jeremy; Sunderam, AdityaWe develop a model in which specialized bond investors must absorb shocks to the supply and demand for long-term bonds in two currencies. Since long-term bonds and foreign exchange are both exposed to unexpected movements in short-term interest rates, a shift in the supply of long-term bonds in one currency influences the foreign exchange rate between the two currencies, as well as bond term premia in both currencies. Our model matches several important empirical patterns, including the comovement between exchange rates and term premia, and the finding that central banks’ quantitative easing policies affect exchange rates. An extension of our model links spot exchange rates to the persistent deviations from covered interest rate parity that have emerged since 2008.Publication Monetary Policy and Long-Term Real Rates(Elsevier, 2014-10-28) Hanson, Samuel; Stein, JeremyChanges in monetary policy have surprisingly strong effects on forward real rates in the distant future. A 100 basis point increase in the two-year nominal yield on a Federal Open Markets Committee announcement day is associated with a 42 basis point increase in the ten-year forward real rate. This finding is at odds with standard macro models based on sticky nominal prices, which imply that monetary policy cannot move real rates over a horizon longer than that over which all prices in the economy can readjust. Instead, the responsiveness of long-term real rates to monetary shocks appears to reflect changes in term premia. One mechanism that could generate such variation in term premia is based on demand effects due to the existence of what we call yield-oriented investors. We find some evidence supportive of this channel.Publication Banks as Patient Fixed-Income Investors(Elsevier, 2015) Hanson, Samuel; Shleifer, Andrei; Stein, Jeremy; Vishny, Robert W.We examine the business model of traditional commercial banks when they compete with shadow banks. While both types of intermediaries create safe "money-like" claims, they go about this in different ways. Traditional banks create money-like claims by holding illiquid fixed-income assets to maturity, and they rely on deposit insurance and costly equity capital to support this strategy. This strategy allows bank depositors to remain "sleepy": they do not have to pay attention to transient fluctuations in the market value of bank assets. In contrast, shadow banks create money-like claims by giving their investors an early exit option requiring the rapid liquidation of assets. Thus, traditional banks have a stable source of funding, while shadow banks are subject to runs and fire-sale losses. In equilibrium, traditional banks have a comparative advantage at holding fixed-income assets that have only modest fundamental risk but are illiquid and have substantial transitory price volatility, whereas shadow banks tend to hold relatively liquid assets.Publication A Comparative-Advantage Approach to Government Debt Maturity(Wiley-Blackwell, 2015-02-19) Greenwood, Robin; Hanson, Samuel; Stein, JeremyWe study optimal government debt maturity in a model where investors derive monetary services from holding riskless short-term securities. In a setting where the government is the only issuer of such riskless paper, it trades off the monetary premium associated with short-term debt against the refinancing risk implied by the need to roll over its debt more often. We then extend the model to allow private financial intermediaries to compete with the government in the provision of short-term, money-like claims. We argue that if there are negative externalities associated with private money creation, the government should tilt its issuance more towards short maturities. The idea is that the government may have a comparative advantage relative to the private sector in bearing refinancing risk and, hence, should aim to partially crowd out the private sector's use of short-term debt.Publication Dollar Funding and the Lending Behavior of Global Banks(Oxford University Press (OUP), 2015-05-19) Ivashina, Victoria; Scharfstein, David; Stein, JeremyA large share of dollar-denominated lending is done by non-U.S. banks, particularly European banks. We present a model in which such banks cut dollar lending more than euro lending in response to a shock to their credit quality. Because these banks rely on wholesale dollar funding, while raising more of their euro funding through insured retail deposits, the shock leads to a greater withdrawal of dollar funding. Banks can borrow in euros and swap into dollars to make up for the dollar shortfall, but this may lead to violations of covered interest parity (CIP) when there is limited capital to take the other side of the swap trade. In this case, synthetic dollar borrowing becomes expensive, which causes cuts in dollar lending. We test the model in the context of the Eurozone sovereign crisis, which escalated in the second half of 2011 and resulted in U.S. money-market funds sharply reducing the funding provided to European banks. Coincident with the contraction in dollar funding, there were significant violations of euro-dollar CIP. Moreover, dollar lending by Eurozone banks fell relative to their euro lending in both the U.S. and Europe; this was not the case for U.S. global banks. Finally, European banks that were more reliant on money funds experienced bigger declines in dollar lending.Publication Disagreement and the Stock Market(American Economic Association, 2007) Hong, Harrison; Stein, JeremyA large catalog of variables with no apparent connection to risk has been shown to forecast stock returns, both in the time series and the cross-section. For instance, we see medium-term momentum and post-earnings drift in returns—the tendency for stocks that have had unusually high past returns or good earnings news to continue to deliver relatively strong returns over the subsequent six to twelve months (and vice-versa for stocks with low past returns or bad earnings news); we also see longer-run fundamental reversion—the tendency for “glamour” stocks with high ratios of market value to earnings, cashflows, or book value to deliver weak returns over the subsequent several years (and vice-versa for “value” stocks with low ratios of market value to fundamentals). To explain these patterns of predictability in stock returns, we advocate a particular class of heterogeneous-agent models that we call “disagreement models.” Disagreement models may incorporate work on gradual information flow, limited attention, and heterogeneous priors, but all highlight the importance of differences in the beliefs of investors. Disagreement models hold the promise of delivering a comprehensive joint account of stock prices and trading volume—and some of the most interesting empirical patterns in the stock market are linked to volume.Publication Conversations among Competitors(American Economic Association, 2008) Stein, JeremyI develop a model of bilateral conversations in which players honestly exchange ideas with their competitors. The key to incentive compatibility is a complementarity in the information structure: a player can only generate a new insight if he has access to his counterpart’s previous thoughts on a topic. I then examine a social network in which A has a conversation with B, then B has a conversation with C, and so on. Relatively underdeveloped ideas can travel long distances over the network. More valuable ideas, by contrast, tend to remain localized among small groups of agents. (JEL D82, D83)Publication The Only Game in Town: Stock-Price Consequences of Local Bias(Elsevier, 2008) Hong, Harrison; Kubik, Jeffrey D.; Stein, JeremyTheory suggests that, in the presence of local bias, the price of a stock should be decreasing in the ratio of the aggregate book value of firms in its region to the aggregate risk tolerance of investors in its region. Using data on U.S. states and Census regions, we find clear-cut support for this proposition. Most of the variation in the ratio of interest comes from differences across regions in aggregate book value per capita. Regions with low population density—e.g., the Deep South—are home to relatively few firms per capita, which leads to higher stock prices via an "only-game-in-town" effect.Publication Informational Externalities and Welfare-Reducing Speculation(University of Chicago Press, 1987) Stein, JeremyIntroducing more speculators into the market for a given commodity leads to improved risk sharing but can also change the informational content of prices. This inflicts an externality on those traders already in the market, whose ability to make inferences based on current prices will be affected. In some cases, the externality is negative: the entry of new speculators lowers the informativeness of the price to existing traders. The net result can be one of price destabilization and welfare reduction. This is true even when all agents are rational, risk-averse, competitors who make the best possible use of their available information.