Person:

Bushell, Claire

This thesis offers a reinterpretation of British appeasement policy through the lens of the often-overlooked 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement, arguing that it represents a pivotal moment of proactive strategic diplomacy. Moving beyond the dominant historical narrative that portrays appeasement as a reactive and monolithic failure, this study introduces a new conceptual framework that distinguishes between proactive and reactive forms of appeasement. Tracing this pattern from the post-Versailles period through the 1920s and early 1930s, this thesis aims to analyze how and why British policymakers consistently pursued diplomatic engagement with Germany through approaches grounded in reciprocity and principled diplomacy. The primary motivation behind this strategy was to uphold the League of Nations and its collective security framework while safeguarding British strategic interests. Furthermore, the thesis demonstrates that this strategy did not develop in isolation; instead, it built upon a longer tradition of appeasement within nineteenth-century British Grand Strategy, where calculated concessions were used to preserve international equilibrium and imperial security. By drawing on parliamentary debates, cabinet records, and diplomatic correspondence, this study highlights how the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was not an isolated misstep but rather the culmination of a coherent interwar strategy before British policy devolved into reactive crisis management later in the decade. By situating the Anglo-German Naval Agreement within this broader historical arc, this thesis reconceptualizes appeasement as an evolving diplomatic instrument and offers a significant contribution to existing scholarship on British foreign policy and interwar diplomacy.