Person: Allison, Graham
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Allison, Graham
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Publication Russia and U.S. National Interests: Why Should Americans Care?(Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs - Harvard Kennedy School, 2011) Allison, Graham; Blackwill, Robert D.; Simes, Dimitri K.; Saunders, Paul J.Publication Blocking All Paths to an Iranian Bomb: How the West Can Avoid a Nuclear Maginot Line(Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs - Harvard Kennedy School, 2014) Allison, Graham; Setter, OrenPublication Nuclear Terrorism: Threat Briefing. How Serious is the Threat?(Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs - Harvard Kennedy School, 2010) Allison, GrahamPublication The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide(Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2015) Samore, Gary; Bunn, Matthew; Allison, Graham; Arnold, Aaron; Burns, R.; Feldman, Shai; Freilich, Chuck; Heinonen, Olli; Malin, Martin; Miller, Steven; Mohseni, Payam; Nephew, Richard; Rockwood, Laura; Sebenius, James; Tobey, WilliamPublication Decoding the Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Questions, Points of Divergence, Pros and Cons, Pending Legislation, and Essential Facts(Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2015) Samore, Gary; Allison, Graham; Bunn, Matthew; Burns, R.; Feldman, Shai; Freilich, Chuck; Heinonen, Olli; Malin, Martin; Miller, Steven; Mohseni, Payam; Rockwood, Laura; Sebenius, James; Tobey, WilliamOn April 2, 2015, the EU (on behalf of the P5+1 countries) and Iran announced agreement on “key parameters” for a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. The EU-Iran Joint Statement is buttressed by unilateral fact sheets issued by the U.S. and Iran, which provide further details of the framework accord. Not surprisingly, differences have emerged between the U.S. and Iranian versions of the deal. These differences reflect both political spin and remaining issues that have not been resolved. In the next phase of this process, the negotiators will seek to finalize a comprehensive agreement by June 30, 2015. To assist Members of Congress and others to evaluate the emerging deal, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School has prepared this Policy Brief summarizing key facts, core concepts, and major arguments for and against the emerging deal. Amidst the sound and fury of claim and counter-claim, the purpose of this Policy Brief is not to advocate support for or opposition to the deal, but rather to provide an objective, nonpartisan summary to inform Members of Congress and others in coming to their own conclusions. The team of experts who prepared this report includes Democrats, Republicans, independents, and internationals, who have many disagreements among themselves, but who agree that this Brief presents the essentials objectively. Since the negotiations are ongoing and the debate is intensifying, we invite readers who disagree with our presentation or who have additional questions or points to send their comments to us at iran_matters@hks.harvard.edu. If suitable, we will post these contributions with attribution on our website Iran Matters.Publication Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet(Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs - Harvard Kennedy School, 2010) Allison, GrahamPublication What Happened to the Soviet Superpower’s Nuclear Arsenal? Clues for the Nuclear Security Summit(John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2012) Allison, GrahamTwenty years ago Russia and fourteen other newly-independent states emerged from the ruins of the Soviet empire, many as nations for the first time in history. As is typical in the aftermath of the collapse of an empire, this was followed by a period of chaos, confusion, and corruption. As the saying went at the time, “everything is for sale.” At that same moment, as the Soviet state imploded, 35,000 nuclear weapons remained at thousands of sites across a vast Eurasian landmass that stretched across eleven time zones. Today, fourteen of the fifteen successor states to the Soviet Union are nuclear weapons-free. When the U.S.S.R. disappeared, 3,200 strategic nuclear warheads remained in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, most of them atop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that stood on alert, ready to be fired at targets in the U.S. Today, every one of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus has been deactivated and returned to Russia, where they were dismantled and the nuclear material in the warheads blended down to produce fuel for civilian reactors. Strategic nuclear weapons are nuclear warheads aimed at an adversary’s nuclear weapons, cities and military infrastructure. Typically, they are large in yield and heavy. Of greater interest to terrorists, however, were the former U.S.S.R’s 22,000 tactical nuclear weapons with smaller yields and shorter ranges. These were designed primarily for battlefield use, with some small enough to fit into a duffel bag. Today, all of these have also been returned to Russia, leaving zero nuclear weapons in any other state of the former Soviet Union. Former Czech president Vaclav Havel observed about the rush of events in the 1990s: “things have changed so fast we have not yet taken time to be astonished.” Perhaps the most astonishing fact about the past twenty years is something that did not happen. Despite the risk realistically estimated by former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in 3 What Happened to the Soviet Superpower's Nuclear Arsenal? Clues for the Nuclear Security Summit December 1991, two decades have passed without the discovery of a single nuclear weapon outside Russia. This paper will address the question: how did this happen? Looking ahead, it will consider what clues we can extract from the success in denuclearizing fourteen post-Soviet states that can inform our non-proliferation and nuclear security efforts in the future. These clues may inform leaders of the U.S., Russia, and other responsible nations attending the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit on March 26-27, 2012. The paper will conclude with specific recommendations, some exceedingly ambitious that world leaders could follow to build on the Seoul summit’s achievements against nuclear terrorism in the period before the next summit in 2014. One of these would be to establish a Global Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism.