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Witkowski, Jens

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Witkowski

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Jens

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Witkowski, Jens

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2011 - 20123

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Author's Publications: search.filters.isAuthorOfPublication.306cd7ad-1d81-41e3-a39e-5b5e8d21ebf4

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Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
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    Peer Prediction without a Common Prior
    (ACM Press, 2012) Witkowski, Jens; Parkes, David
    Reputation mechanisms at online opinion forums, such as Amazon Reviews, elicit ratings from users about their experience with different products. Crowdsourcing applications, such as image tagging on Amazon Mechanical Turk, elicit votes from users as to whether or not a job was duly completed. An important property in both settings is that the feedback received from users (agents) is truthful. The peer prediction method introduced by Miller et al. [2005] is a prominent theoretical mechanism for the truthful elicitation of reports. However, a significant obstacle to its application is that it critically depends on the assumption of a common prior amongst both the agents and the mechanism. In this paper, we develop a peer prediction mechanism for settings where the agents hold subjective and private beliefs about the state of the world and the likelihood of a positive signal given a particular state. Our shadow peer prediction mechanism exploits temporal structure in order to elicit two reports, a belief report and then a signal report, and it provides strict incentives for truthful reporting as long as the effect an agent's signal has on her posterior belief is bounded away from zero. Alternatively, this technical requirement on beliefs can be dispensed with by a modification in which the second report is a belief report rather than a signal report.
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    A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Small Populations
    (Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, 2012) Witkowski, Jens; Parkes, David
    Peer prediction mechanisms allow the truthful elicitation of private signals (e.g., experiences, or opinions) in regard to a true world state when this ground truth is unobservable. The original peer prediction method is incentive compatible for any number of agents n >= 2, but relies on a common prior, shared by all agents and the mechanism. The Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) relaxes this assumption. While BTS still assumes that agents share a common prior, this prior need not be known to the mechanism. However, BTS is only incentive compatible for a large enough number of agents, and the particular number of agents required is uncertain because it depends on this private prior. In this paper, we present a robust BTS for the elicitation of binary information which is incentive compatible for every n >= 3, taking advantage of a particularity of the quadratic scoring rule. The robust BTS is the first peer prediction mechanism to provide strict incentive compatibility for every n >= 3 without relying on knowledge of the common prior. Moreover, and in contrast to the original BTS, our mechanism is numerically robust and ex post individually rational.
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    Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms
    (American Association for Artificial Intelligence, 2011) Witkowski, Jens; Seuken, Sven; Parkes, David
    The most prominent way to establish trust between buyers and sellers on online auction sites are reputation mechanisms. Two drawbacks of this approach are the reliance on the seller being long-lived and the susceptibility to whitewashing. In this paper, we introduce so-called escrow mechanisms that avoid these problems by installing a trusted intermediary which forwards the payment to the seller only if the buyer acknowledges that the good arrived in the promised condition. We address the incentive issues that arise and design an escrow mechanism that is incentive compatible, efficient, interim individually rational and ex ante budget-balanced. In contrast to previous work on trust and reputation, our approach does not rely on knowing the sellers’ cost functions or the distribution of buyer valuations.