Person:

Hanson, Samuel

We develop a model in which capital moves quickly within an asset class but slowly between asset classes. While most investors specialize in a single asset class, a handful of generalists can gradually reallocate capital across markets. Upon the arrival of a large supply shock, prices of risk in the directly impacted asset class become disconnected from those in others. Over the long run, capital flows between markets and prices of risk become more closely aligned. While prices in the directly impacted market initially overreact to the supply shock, we show that prices in related asset classes underreact under plausible conditions. We use the model to assess event-study evidence on the impact of recent large-scale asset purchases by central banks.

Using historical data on post-war financial crises around the world, we show that crises are substantially predictable. The combination of rapid credit and asset price growth over the prior three years, whether in the nonfinancial business or the household sector, is associated with about a 40% probability of entering a financial crisis within the next three years. This compares with a roughly 7% probability in normal times, when neither credit nor asset price growth has been elevated. Our evidence cuts against the view that financial crises are unpredictable “bolts from the sky” and points toward the Kindleberger-Minsky view that crises are the byproduct of predictable, boom-bust credit cycles. The predictability we document favors macro-financial policies that “lean against the wind” of credit market booms. Replication kit and appendix available here: https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=60191

We develop a model of government portfolio choice in which a benevolent government chooses the scale of risky projects in the presence of market failures and tax distortions. These two frictions generate motives to manage social risk and fiscal risk. Social risk management makes attractive programs that ameliorate market failures in bad economic times. Fiscal risk management makes unattractive programs that entail large government outlays at times when other programs in the government's portfolio also require large outlays. We characterize the determinants of social and fiscal risk and argue that these two risk management motives often conflict. Using the model, we explore how the attractiveness of different financial stability programs varies with the government's fiscal burden and with characteristics of the economy.