Person: Saradzhyan, Simon
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Saradzhyan
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Saradzhyan, Simon
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Publication Why Russia’s alliance with China is improbable, but not impossible(2020) Saradzhyan, SimonPublication Russia's Support for Zero: Tactical Move or Long-term Commitment?(Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2009) Saradzhyan, SimonPublication Breaking the Stalemate of Collective Insecurity in Europe(Belfer Center for Science an International Affairs, 2011) Saradzhyan, SimonThere is a clear convergence of vital security interests of Russia and NATO countries in that: No nuclear weapons or improvised nuclear devices are used. No more states acquire nuclear weapons or long-range delivery systems. No sub-state actors acquire nuclear weapons or improvised nuclear devices. No acts of conventional or WMD terrorism with catastrophic consequences take place. No inter-state wars occur in Europe/Eurasia. No states in Eurasia fail and or become safe havens for international terrorist groups. Different vertices in the polygon, which Russia and NATO members form, have varying degrees of capabilities and motivation in tackling these challenges. They also often disagree on ways and means of doing so. When it comes to issues that divide Russia and NATO countries, hindering their cooperation, there is one that stands out and that, if resolved, can become a game-changer in Russia’s relations with the United States and its NATO allies: building of European missile. The paper outlines these measures, which, if adopted, will allow Russia and NATO countries to overcome their differences and begin to build cooperative missile defenses in what may eventually help to facilitate emergence of a security alliance of Moscow, Washington and Brussels either in the form of Russia’s membership in NATO or in some other form. In the absence of Russia's membership in NATO, substantive cooperation of Russia with NATO and the United States on missile defense could become a game changer in Russia’s relations with Washington and Brussels. If institutionalized, such cooperation will not only strengthen collective security of European countries, but will also help to end the military stand-off between the alliance and Moscow and pave way for deepening of cooperation between them and perhaps eventual members of Russia in the alliance.Publication Russia: Grasping the Reality of Nuclear Terror(SAGE Publications, 2006) Saradzhyan, SimonRadical separatists based in the North Caucasus have the motive and are seeking the means to commit an act of nuclear terrorism as well as allies to help them carry it out. Their proximity to insufficiently secured Russian nuclear facilities and their contents makes the prospect of nuclear terror in Russia very real. This article assesses the magnitude of this threat, considers possible attack scenarios, and suggests ways to reduce the likelihood of a catastrophic attack on Russian soil.Publication Crimea Is Just One Episode in Russia’s Long Game in Post-Soviet Eurasia(2014) Saradzhyan, SimonPublication Seven Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis for the Karabakh Conflict(Belfor Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2012) Saradzhyan, Simon; Saradhyan, ArturThis paper will explore which lessons of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis Armenian and Azeri leaders should consider institutionalizing if they wish to prevent reheating of their conflict over Nagorny Karabakh into a war. Using the October 1962 crisis as an example, the paper will demonstrate how dangerously mistaken national leaders could be when they place their bets on their ability to control conflict escalation. What a leader may perceive as an incremental step – that he is taking to up the pressure on the opponent – can set off a chain of actions on international, national, organizational, and even personal levels, the confluence of which could lead to an armageddon. Specifically, the paper will describe cases when contingency routines developed by organizations at the time of the 1962 crisis could have pushed conflicting sides into a war against wishes or even explicit orders of national leaders, and how that possibility may arise in the Karabakh conflict. The authors will also argue that escalation of the Cuban missile crisis could have acquired its own logic, pre-determining a sequence of events that may have ultimately resulted into an all-out war and how the same can happen with the Karabakh conflict. The paper will also highlight how damaging absence of direct communication between supreme leadership of conflicting sides could be in times of crisis. This paper will seek to prove how difficult it may be to achieve de-escalation of a conflict in absence of either overwhelming superiority by one side or fear of mutually assured destruction on both sides. The authors will also make a case for how vital it is to avoid cornering your opponent or yourself, and how important it is for the opponents to factor in interests of other key stakeholders. Using Soviet actions in 1962 as an example, the paper will argue that poor execution can ruin most brilliant plans and cost the author of these daring designs his career. The paper will conclude with a number of recommendations for Armenian and Azeri leaders interested in preventing a new war over Nagorny Karabakh.Publication Russia’s Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Their Current Configuration and Posture: A Strategic Asset or Liability?(Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2010) Saradzhyan, SimonRussia's military-political leadership envisions a formidable range of uses for the country's arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). In the eyes of Russian leaders, these weapons play a critical role in the nation's defense and security posture as part of the country's overall nuclear arsenal and as an equalizer for the weakness of the nation's conventional forces vis-a-vis NATO and China. Russia's military-political leadership and policy influentials also assign a number of specific roles to NSNWs, including deterrence of powers in the south. Given these perceived and real benefits of possessing NSNWs, it is rather difficult to imagine that Russia will agree to eliminate all of its non-strategic nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future even if its actions are fully reciprocated by the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states. However, securing Russia's consent to negotiate an arms control treaty that would reduce the numbers of non-strategic nuclear weapons and put them under accounting and verification regimes is not a mission impossible. First, only some of the roles envisioned for these weapons are realistic, and these roles require far fewer NSNWs than what Russia has today. Second, the Russian leadership's perceptions of NSNWs' roles can change too. In fact, Russia has already either indicated or explicitly stated conditions that if met, would facilitate Moscow's consent to verifiable reductions of Russian and U.S. NSNWs, which are now subject only to unilateral U.S. and Russian presidential initiatives, which are unverifiable and non-binding. There are also a number of other factors that can help lower the value of NSNWs in the eyes of the Russian military-political leadership. Third, while there are perceived benefits of possessing tactical nuclear weapons, there are also formidable risks and costs incurred by Russia's current NSNW posture. I would argue that a Russian-U.S. arms control treaty with verification and accounting mechanisms would be a good first step to both reducing these risks and costs and to bringing the numbers of NSNWs down to levels sufficient for the roles that these weapons can realistically play.Publication Transcending Mutual Deterrence in the U.S.-Russian Relationship(Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2013) Bunn, Matthew; Kuznetsov, Valentin; Morozov, Yuri; Samore, Gary; Saradzhyan, Simon; Tobey, William; Yesin, Viktor; Zolotarev, PavelEven as this paper was being written and edited, U.S.-Russian relations have warmed and chilled. Today, as we are about to go to press, marks a particularly chilly period in recent history, with the cancellation of a planned Moscow Summit in September 2013. To some, this cold spell might signal an inapt moment to consider issues related to transcending mutual deterrence. Such a view would overlook the aims of the paper, which attempts to assess the central and enduring interests of the United States and Russia, the extent to which they coincide or conflict, and whether or not in light of these interests mutual deterrence should remain a fundamental feature of the relationship. The analysis and recommendations offered below are based on a long-term view. The inevitable and transitory changes in the U.S.-Russian relationship cannot gainsay them. Indeed, at moments of temporary frustration or elation it is most important to think strategically about central and enduring national interests and how best to secure them.Publication Lee Kuan Yew’s Lessons For Armenia(2013) Saradzhyan, Simon; Harutyunyan, MonicaThere is hardly a statesman left in the world who has not heard about Singapore’s economic miracle, which began almost 50 years ago and continues to date. If there is a single person without whom Singapore’s phenomenal transformation would not have been possible, that person is Lee Kuan Yew. Lee’s record of transforming Singapore has become the subject of dozens of books, but there is one recent book that stands out, written by U.S. statesmen Graham Allison and Robert D. Blackwill, with the help of Harvard University researcher Ali Wyne. Published in March 2013, Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World mostly focuses on China’s rise. However, the book also represents a comprehensive collection of practical advice from the founding father of Singapore on how to build and run an effective public administration system that every statesman of any country would find useful.Publication Russia’s System to Combat Terrorism and Its Application in Chechnya(IOP, 2006) Saradzhyan, SimonThis chapter identifies and analyses the major changes in Russia’s organizational response to terrorism since the September 2004 hostage-taking drama in Beslan. The chapter examines the benefits and disadvantages of the newly-established National Counter-Terrorism Committee and logically extends current trends shaping the federal counter-terrorism hierarchy into the near future where possible. The chapter then describes how Russia's counter-terrorism policies, which are formulated in the Kremlin, are applied on the ground in Chechnya, which remains the testing ground for most of the new counter-terrorism initiatives that Russian authorities adopt. The chapter concludes with a number of general recommendations on how to address the flaws within the existing system.