Person:

Smith, Maurice

Which is heavier: a pound of lead or a pound of feathers? This classic trick question belies a simple but surprising truth: when lifted, the pound of lead feels heavier—a phenomenon known as the size–weight illusion. To estimate the weight of an object, our CNS combines two imperfect sources of information: a prior expectation, based on the object's appearance, and direct sensory information from lifting it. Bayes' theorem (or Bayes' law) defines the statistically optimal way to combine multiple information sources for maximally accurate estimation. Here we asked whether the mechanisms for combining these information sources produce statistically optimal weight estimates for both perceptions and actions. We first studied the ability of subjects to hold one hand steady when the other removed an object from it, under conditions in which sensory information about the object's weight sometimes conflicted with prior expectations based on its size. Since the ability to steady the supporting hand depends on the generation of a motor command that accounts for lift timing and object weight, hand motion can be used to gauge biases in weight estimation by the motor system. We found that these motor system weight estimates reflected the integration of prior expectations with real-time proprioceptive information in a Bayesian, statistically optimal fashion that discounted unexpected sensory information. This produces a motor size–weight illusion that consistently biases weight estimates toward prior expectations. In contrast, when subjects compared the weights of two objects, their perceptions defied Bayes' law, exaggerating the value of unexpected sensory information. This produces a perceptual size–weight illusion that biases weight perceptions away from prior expectations. We term this effect “anti-Bayesian” because the bias is opposite that seen in Bayesian integration. Our findings suggest that two fundamentally different strategies for the integration of prior expectations with sensory information coexist in the nervous system for weight estimation.

Any passive rigid inertial object that we hold in our hand, e.g., a tennis racquet, imposes a field of forces on the arm that depends on limb position, velocity, and acceleration. A fundamental characteristic of this field is that the forces due to acceleration and velocity are linearly separable in the intrinsic coordinates of the limb. In order to learn such dynamics with a collection of basis elements, a control system would generalize correctly and therefore perform optimally if the basis elements that were sensitive to limb velocity were not sensitive to acceleration, and vice versa. However, in the mammalian nervous system proprioceptive sensors like muscle spindles encode a nonlinear combination of all components of limb state, with sensitivity to velocity dominating sensitivity to acceleration. Therefore, limb state in the space of proprioception is not linearly separable despite the fact that this separation is a desirable property of control systems that form models of inertial objects. In building internal models of limb dynamics, does the brain use a representation that is optimal for control of inertial objects, or a representation that is closely tied to how peripheral sensors measure limb state? Here we show that in humans, patterns of generalization of reaching movements in acceleration-dependent fields are strongly inconsistent with basis elements that are optimized for control of inertial objects. Unlike a robot controller that models the dynamics of the natural world and represents velocity and acceleration independently, internal models of dynamics that people learn appear to be rooted in the properties of proprioception, nonlinearly responding to the pattern of muscle activation and representing velocity more strongly than acceleration.

Adaptive control of reaching depends on internal models that associate states in which the limb experienced a force perturbation with motor commands that can compensate for it. Limb state can be sensed via both vision and proprioception. However, adaptation of reaching in novel dynamics results in generalization in the intrinsic coordinates of the limb, suggesting that the proprioceptive states in which the limb was perturbed dominate representation of limb state. To test this hypothesis, we considered a task where position of the hand during a reach was correlated with patterns of force perturbation. This correlation could be sensed via vision, proprioception, or both. As predicted, when the correlations could be sensed only via proprioception, learning was significantly better as compared to when the correlations could only be sensed through vision. We found that learning with visual correlations resulted in subjects who could verbally describe the patterns of perturbations but this awareness was never observed in subjects who learned the task with only proprioceptive correlations. We manipulated the relative values of the visual and proprioceptive parameters and found that the probability of becoming aware strongly depended on the correlations that subjects could visually observe. In all conditions, aware subjects demonstrated a small but significant advantage in their ability to adapt their motor commands. Proprioceptive correlations produced an internal model that strongly influenced reaching performance yet did not lead to awareness. Visual correlations strongly increased the probability of becoming aware, yet had a much smaller but still significant effect on reaching performance. Therefore, practice resulted in acquisition of both implicit and explicit internal models.

Lesion or degeneration of the cerebellum can profoundly impair adaptive control of reaching in humans. Computational models have proposed that internal models that help control movements form in the cerebellum and influence planned motor output through the cerebello-thalamo-cortical pathway. However, lesion studies of the cerebellar thalamus have not consistently found impairment in reaching or adaptation of reaching. To elucidate the role of the cerebellar thalamus in humans, we studied a group of essential tremor (ET) patients with deep brain stimulation (DBS) electrodes placed in the cerebellar thalamus. The stimulation can be turned on or off remotely and is thought to reduce tremor by blocking the spread of the pathological output from the cerebellum. We studied the effect of thalamic DBS on the ability to adapt arm movements to novel force fields. Although thalamic DBS resulted in a dramatic and significant reduction of tremor in ET, it also impaired motor adaptation: the larger the stimulation voltage, the greater the reduction in rates of adaptation. We next examined ET patients that had undergone unilateral thalamotomy in the cerebellar thalamus and found that adaptation with the contralateral arm was impaired compared with the ipsilateral arm. Therefore, although both lesion and electrical stimulation of the cerebellar thalamus are highly effective in reducing tremor, they significantly impair the ability of the brain to form internal models of action. Adaptive control of reaching appears to depend on the integrity of the cerebello-thalamo-cortical pathway.

Achild often learns to ride a bicycle in the driveway, free of unforeseen obstacles. Yet when she first rides in the street, we hope that if a car suddenly pulls out in front of her, she will combine her innate goal of avoiding an accident with her learned knowledge of the bicycle, and steer away or brake. In general, when we train to perform a new motor task, our learning is most robust if it updates the rules of online error correction to reflect the rules and goals of the new task. Here we provide direct evidence that, after a new feedforward motor adaptation, motor feedback responses to unanticipated errors become precisely task appropriate, even when such errors were never experienced during training. To study this ability, we asked how, if at all, do online responses to occasional, unanticipated force pulses during reaching arm movements change after adapting to altered arm dynamics? Specifically, do they change in a task-appropriate manner? In our task, subjects learned novel velocity-dependent dynamics. However, occasional force-pulse perturbations produced unanticipated changes in velocity. Therefore, after adaptation, task-appropriate responses to unanticipated pulses should compensate corresponding changes in velocity-dependent dynamics.Wefound that after adaptation, pulse responses precisely compensated these changes, although they were never trained to do so. These results provide evidence for a smart feedback controller which automatically produces responses specific to the learned dynamics of the current task. To accomplish this, the neural processes underlying feedback control must (1) be capable of accurate real-time state prediction for velocity via a forward model and (2) have access to recently learned changes in internal models of limb dynamics.