Person:

Tobey, William

Nuclear terrorism is a real and urgent threat. Given the potentially catastrophic consequences, even a small probability of terrorists getting and detonating a nuclear bomb is enough to justify urgent action to reduce the risk. Al-Qaeda and North Caucasus terrorist groups have both made statements indicating that they seek nuclear weapons and have attempted to acquire them; these groups are presented together as a case study to assess nuclear terrorism as a present and future threat. (The only other terrorist group known to have systematically sought to get nuclear weapons was the Japanese cult group Aum Shinrikyo.) This study makes the case that it is plausible that a technically sophisticated group could make, deliver, and detonate a crude nuclear bomb if it could obtain sufficient fissile material. The study offers recommendations for actions to reduce this danger.

The threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism has not disappeared, though the world has made important progress in reducing these risks. Urgent new steps are needed to build effective and lasting nuclear security worldwide. The nuclear security effort must now shift from short-term improvements toward a focus on a continued search for excellence, lasting as long as terrorist groups bent on mass destruction and the nuclear and radiological materials they might use both continue to exist.

On April 2, 2015, the EU (on behalf of the P5+1 countries) and Iran announced agreement on “key parameters” for a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. The EU-Iran Joint Statement is buttressed by unilateral fact sheets issued by the U.S. and Iran, which provide further details of the framework accord. Not surprisingly, differences have emerged between the U.S. and Iranian versions of the deal. These differences reflect both political spin and remaining issues that have not been resolved. In the next phase of this process, the negotiators will seek to finalize a comprehensive agreement by June 30, 2015. To assist Members of Congress and others to evaluate the emerging deal, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School has prepared this Policy Brief summarizing key facts, core concepts, and major arguments for and against the emerging deal. Amidst the sound and fury of claim and counter-claim, the purpose of this Policy Brief is not to advocate support for or opposition to the deal, but rather to provide an objective, nonpartisan summary to inform Members of Congress and others in coming to their own conclusions. The team of experts who prepared this report includes Democrats, Republicans, independents, and internationals, who have many disagreements among themselves, but who agree that this Brief presents the essentials objectively. Since the negotiations are ongoing and the debate is intensifying, we invite readers who disagree with our presentation or who have additional questions or points to send their comments to us at iran_matters@hks.harvard.edu. If suitable, we will post these contributions with attribution on our website Iran Matters.

Even as this paper was being written and edited, U.S.-Russian relations have warmed and chilled. Today, as we are about to go to press, marks a particularly chilly period in recent history, with the cancellation of a planned Moscow Summit in September 2013. To some, this cold spell might signal an inapt moment to consider issues related to transcending mutual deterrence. Such a view would overlook the aims of the paper, which attempts to assess the central and enduring interests of the United States and Russia, the extent to which they coincide or conflict, and whether or not in light of these interests mutual deterrence should remain a fundamental feature of the relationship. The analysis and recommendations offered below are based on a long-term view. The inevitable and transitory changes in the U.S.-Russian relationship cannot gainsay them. Indeed, at moments of temporary frustration or elation it is most important to think strategically about central and enduring national interests and how best to secure them.

The work of improving nuclear security is not done, though leaders are no longer meeting at the summit level. The threats of nuclear theft and terrorism remain very real. States, nuclear operating organizations, and institutions and initiatives supporting nuclear security must strive for continuous improvement in nuclear security. The alternative is dangerous decline. Achieving genuinely effective implementation of existing recommendations and commitments in five key areas could dramatically strengthen nuclear security around the world.

First, states and operators must protect nuclear weapons, weapons-usable nuclear materials, and major nuclear facilities against the full range of plausible adversary capabilities and tactics. The focus must be on continuous improvement in the face of ever-evolving adversary threats.

Second, all operators managing nuclear weapons, weapons-usable nuclear materials, and high-consequence nuclear facilities should put in place comprehensive programs to protect against insider threats – the most important and challenging nuclear security threats. Insider protection programs are particularly important at facilities that handle weapons-usable nuclear material in bulk.

Third, states should ensure that each relevant nuclear operator has a targeted program in place to assess and strengthen security culture, and all nuclear managers and security-relevant staff receive regular information, appropriate to their role, on evolving threats. At the same time, interested countries should launch a number of initiatives designed to build understanding of the threat and combat complacency.

Fourth, states should ensure that all nuclear operators establish in-depth vulnerability assessment and performance testing programs to ensure that nuclear security systems really are able to protect against intelligent adversaries. These should include regular, realistic force-on-force exercises.

Fifth, interested countries should take a broader approach to consolidating nuclear material at fewer locations, encompassing more categories of material and additional policy tools.

These five areas are largely already included in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security recommendations, and are therefore covered in the commitment to meet the “intent” of such initiatives incorporated in the Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation Initiative (INFCIRC/869). But achieving genuinely effective implementation will remain a challenge, particularly with national leaders no longer meeting at the summit level. As nuclear security must continue to evolve in the face of changing threats, it is essential to continue an effective ongoing international dialogue on nuclear security, both about implementation of existing recommendations and commitments and about new steps. This should include the IAEA, the “contact group” established at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, and other groupings. States should revitalize bilateral nuclear security cooperation efforts, including between the United States and Russia. Both industry and civil society also have essential roles to play. With champions from all these sectors around the world working together, and a focus on genuinely effective implementation, nuclear security can be dramatically strengthened, reducing risks to all countries.