Person: Jackson, Howell
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Jackson, Howell
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Publication Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay(1999) Jackson, HowellThis Article reviews differences in regulatory structure across sectors of the financial services industry in the United States and then explores the difficulties these differences pose to our current system of regulation and also to proposals for financial modernization.Publication Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence(Simon Business School. University of Rochester., 2009) Roe, Mark; Jackson, HowellAscertaining which enforcement mechanisms work to protect investors has been both a focus of recent work in academic finance and an issue for policy-making at international development agencies. According to recent academic work, private enforcement of investor protection via both disclosure and private liability rules goes hand in hand with financial market development, but public enforcement fails to correlate with financial development and, hence, is unlikely to facilitate it. Our results confirm the disclosure result but reverse the results on both liability standards and public enforcement. We use securities regulators' resources to proxy for regulatory intensity of the securities regulator. When we do, financial depth regularly, significantly, and robustly correlates with stronger public enforcement. In horse races between these resource-based measures of public enforcement intensity and the most common measures of private enforcement, public enforcement is overall as important as disclosure in explaining financial market outcomes around the world and more important than private liability rules. Hence, policymakers who reject public enforcement as useful for financial market development are ignoring the best currently-available evidence.Publication Consumer Financial Protection(American Economic Association, 2011) Campbell, John; Jackson, Howell; Madrian, Brigitte; Tufano, PeterThe recent financial crisis has led many to question how well businesses deliver services and how well regulatory institutions address problems in consumer financial markets. This paper discusses consumer financial regulation, emphasizing the full range of arguments for regulation that derive from market failure and from limited consumer rationality in financial decision making. We present three case studies—of mortgage markets, payday lending, and financing retirement consumption—to illustrate the need for, and limits of, regulation. We argue that if regulation is to be beneficial, it must be tailored to specific problems and must be accompanied by research to measure the effectiveness of regulatory interventions.Publication Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents: Implications for Public Policy in a Pluralist System(Harvard University, Harvard Law School, 2010) Stephenson, Matthew; Jackson, HowellInterest group pluralism presumes that public policy outcomes are determined principally through a contest for influence among organized pressure groups. Most interest groups, however, do not represent themselves in this process. Rather, they rely on professional lobbyists for representation, information, and advice. These lobbyists are agents with their own interests, and these interests may not align perfectly with those of their clients. This essay outlines this principal-agent problem and sketches its possible implications for policy outcomes. In particular, we hypothesize that the lobbyist-client agency problem may bias policy in favor of small homogeneous groups, may exacerbate status quo bias and lead to excessive attention to symbolic issues, may promote expansive delegations to administrative agencies, and may impede systematic reforms to the policy-making process.Publication Markets as Regulators: A Survey(University of South California Law Center, 2007) Gadinis, Stavros; Jackson, HowellStock exchanges around the world have recently discarded their traditional mutual membership structure in favor of a for-profit corporate format. This development increased fears of conflicts of interest, as for-profit exchanges are more sensitive to pressures from their constituents and more likely to abuse their regulatory powers. In this Article, we explore the allocation of regulatory responsibilities to market infrastructure institutions, administrative agencies, and central government entities in the eight most influential jurisdictions for securities regulation in the world. Examining how different jurisdictions answer this question is particularly pressing given the December 2006 transatlantic stock exchange merger activity. After discussing the role of self-regulatory organizations in the oversight of modern stock exchanges, we report the results of a survey of the allocation of regulatory powers in a sample of eight key jurisdictions. In that survey, we examine the allocation of such powers at three levels: rulemaking, monitoring of compliance with these rules, and enforcement of rules violations. Based on our findings, we categorize these jurisdictions in three distinct models of allocation of regulatory powers: a Government-led Model that preserves significant authority for central government control over securities markets regulation, albeit with a relatively limited enforcement apparatus (France, Germany, and Japan); a Flexibility Model that grants significant leeway to market participants in performing their regulatory obligations, but relies on government agencies to set general policies and maintain some enforcement capacity (United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and Australia); and a Cooperation Model that assigns a broad range of power to market participants in almost all aspects of securities regulation, but also maintains strong and overlapping oversight of market activity through well-endowed governmental agencies with more robust enforcement traditions (United States and Canada).Publication A System of Selective Substitute Compliance(Harvard University, Harvard Law School, 2007) Jackson, HowellPublication The Regulation of Consumer Financial Products: An Introductory Essay with Four Case Studies(John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2010) Cambpbell, John Y.; Jackson, Howell; Madrian, Brigitte; Tufano, PeterThe recent financial crisis has led many to question how well businesses deliver consumer financial services and how well regulatory institutions address problems in consumer financial markets. In response, the Obama administration proposed a new agency to oversee consumer financial services, and the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act embraced the Administration’s proposal by creating the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. Other regulatory reforms have been advanced, and in some cases adopted, in recent years, at both the federal and state level. In this paper, we provide an overview of consumer financial markets, detailing the purposes they serve, the extent to which they suffer from market failures or other deficiencies, and the structure of our current system of regulation. To illustrate our analytical framework, we present case studies on retirement savings, residential mortgages, payday lending, and mutual funds. We conclude with a series of observations on the limits of government intervention, suggestions about how to measure whether government intervention is successful, and potentially fruitful lines of future research and data collection.Publication The Treasury Option: How the US Can Achieve the Financial Inclusion Benefits of a CBDC Now(Brookings Institute, 2022-03-10) Jackson, Howell; Massad, TimothyPublication How We Can Regulate Stablecoins Now--Without Congressional Action(Brookings Institute, 2022-08) Jackson, Howell; Massad, Timothy; Awrey, DanThis White Paper presents a proposal for federal regulation of stablecoins under existing law. Following the recommendations of the 2021 President’s Working Group’s Stablecoin Report, we propose the creation of a federal framework for the issuance of stablecoins within the regulatory framework for insured depository institutions. Under current law, the Comptroller of the Currency could authorize a national trust bank charter, organized as an operating subsidiary of an insured depository institution, to create stablecoins through the use of a dedicated trust vehicle. With our proposal, the Comptroller would also adopt standards limiting the investment of stablecoin reserves to high quality assets and address redemptions and operational resilience, among other matters. The creation of this federal regulatory structure puts the “stable” in stablecoins, offering consumers a far higher level of protection than the state-level regulatory frameworks that currently govern most stablecoin issuers while providing protection against financial stability risks should the stablecoin market continue to grow. Our approach could promote increased competition in payments services and potentially safeguard the role of the dollar in international finance. While our framework would not be mandatory, we believe our approach would provide substantial benefits to stablecoin sponsors, increasing the likelihood that they would opt into the framework. Although new legislation is not needed, coordination across government agencies would be necessary to implement our recommendations effectively. The federal banking agencies—the Federal Reserve Board, the OCC, and the FDIC—would all have to support this stablecoin framework and buy-in from both the SEC and CFTC would be highly desirable. We recommend that a working group of the Financial Stability Oversight Council quarterback this coordination. Our proposal is self-consciously incremental and cautious, imposing stringent and overlapping safeguards and preserving the separation of banking and commerce. If successful, our proposal might later be liberalized in a variety of ways. The experience gained in developing our approach could also be useful in drafting more comprehensive legislation. What we propose here is simply a sensible but significant first step.