Person:

Rand, David Gertler

People often favor members of their own group, while discriminating against members of other groups. Such in-group favoritism has been shown to play an important role in human cooperation. However, in the face of changing conflicts and shifting alliances, it is essential for group identities to be flexible. Using the dictator game from behavioral economics, we demonstrate the remodeling of group identities among supporters of Democratic presidential candidates Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. After Clinton's concession in June 2008, Democrats were more generous toward supporters of their own preferred candidate than to supporters of the other Democratic candidate. The bias observed in June persisted into August, and disappeared only in early September after the Democratic National Convention. We also observe a strong gender effect, with bias both appearing and subsiding among men only. This experimental study illustrates a dynamic change in bias, tracking the realignment of real world conflict lines and public efforts to reconstitute group identity. The change in salient group identity we describe here likely contributed to the victory of Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election.

Background: In a recent controversial essay, published by JPA Ioannidis in PLoS Medicine, it has been argued that in some research fields, most of the published findings are false. Based on theoretical reasoning it can be shown that small effect sizes, error-prone tests, low priors of the tested hypotheses and biases in the evaluation and publication of research findings increase the fraction of false positives. These findings raise concerns about the reliability of research. However, they are based on a very simple scenario of scientific research, where single tests are used to evaluate independent hypotheses. Methodology/Principal Findings: In this study, we present computer simulations and experimental approaches for analyzing more realistic scenarios. In these scenarios, research tasks are solved sequentially, i.e. subsequent tests can be chosen depending on previous results. We investigate simple sequential testing and scenarios where only a selected subset of results can be published and used for future rounds of test choice. Results from computer simulations indicate that for the tasks analyzed in this study, the fraction of false among the positive findings declines over several rounds of testing if the most informative tests are performed. Our experiments show that human subjects frequently perform the most informative tests, leading to a decline of false positives as expected from the simulations. Conclusions/Significance: For the research tasks studied here, findings tend to become more reliable over time. We also find that the performance in those experimental settings where not all performed tests could be published turned out to be surprisingly inefficient. Our results may help optimize existing procedures used in the practice of scientific research and provide guidance for the development of novel forms of scholarly communication.

Background: Citation data can be used to evaluate the editorial policies and procedures of scientific journals. Here we investigate citation counts for the three different publication tracks of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS). This analysis explores the consequences of differences in editor and referee selection, while controlling for the prestige of the journal in which the papers appear. Methodology/Principal Findings: We find that papers authored and “Contributed” by NAS members (Track III) are on average cited less often than papers that are “Communicated” for others by NAS members (Track I) or submitted directly via the standard peer review process (Track II). However, we also find that the variance in the citation count of Contributed papers, and to a lesser extent Communicated papers, is larger than for direct submissions. Therefore when examining the 10% most-cited papers from each track, Contributed papers receive the most citations, followed by Communicated papers, while Direct submissions receive the least citations. Conclusion/Significance: Our findings suggest that PNAS “Contributed” papers, in which NAS–member authors select their own reviewers, balance an overall lower impact with an increased probability of publishing exceptional papers. This analysis demonstrates that different editorial procedures are associated with different levels of impact, even within the same prominent journal, and raises interesting questions about the most appropriate metrics for judging an editorial policy's success.

The standard model for direct reciprocity is the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, where in each round players choose between cooperation and defection. Here we extend the standard framework to include costly punishment. Now players have a choice between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. We study the set of all reactive strategies, where the behavior depends on what the other player has done in the previous round. We find all cooperative strategies that are Nash equilibria. If the cost of cooperation is greater than the cost of punishment, then the only cooperative Nash equilibrium is generous-tit-for-tat (GTFT), which does not use costly punishment. If the cost of cooperation is less than the cost of punishment, then there are infinitely many cooperative Nash equilibria and the response to defection can include costly punishment. We also perform computer simulations of evolutionary dynamics in populations of finite size. These simulations show that in the context of direct reciprocity, (i) natural selection prefers generous tit-for-tat over strategies that use costly punishment, and (ii) that costly punishment does not promote the evolution of cooperation. We find quantitative agreement between our simulation results and data from experimental observations.

The public goods game is the classic laboratory paradigm for studying collective action problems. Each participant chooses how much to contribute to a common pool that returns benefits to all participants equally. The ideal outcome occurs if everybody contributes the maximum amount, but the self-interested strategy is not to contribute anything. Most previous studies have found punishment to be more effective than reward for maintaining cooperation in public goods games. The typical design of these studies, however, represses future consequences for today’s actions. In an experimental setting, we compare public goods games followed by punishment, reward, or both in the setting of truly repeated games, in which player identities persist from round to round. We show that reward is as effective as punishment for maintaining public cooperation and leads to higher total earnings. Moreover, when both options are available, reward leads to increased contributions and payoff, whereas punishment has no effect on contributions and leads to lower payoff. We conclude that reward outperforms punishment in repeated public goods games and that human cooperation in such repeated settings is best supported by positive interactions with others.