Rights are defined by certain specific duties, and they are justified on the ground that they are necessary to protect important individual interests. The paper examines the relation between a right and the duties that define it, and the relation between a right and the interests that justify it. The latter form of justification is not "instrumental," in a way that contrasts with the justification of other moral claims. The idea that rights conflict and must be “balanced” against each other is a mistake. Interests can conflict and must be balanced; rights must be defined so that they do not conflict.
This essay considers the disagreement between Cohen and Rawls on the question of whether individuals should be held responsible for their tastes and preferences. It notes the difference in principle, since the primary goods measure of Rawls holds individuals responsible for their choices as to how to deploy these goods, whereas Cohen’s aim is to equalize access to advantage, and thereby the satisfaction of persons, however costly. It is argued that since Cohen concedes that practical matters of application might compromise egalitarian principle, the two thinkers might be, in practice, not that dissimilar.
