Person: Brochet, Francois
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Brochet
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Francois
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Brochet, Francois
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Publication Do Analysts Follow Managers Who Switch Companies? An Analysis of Relationships in the Capital Markets(2014) Brochet, Francois; Miller, Gregory S.; Srinivasan, SurajWe examine the importance of professional relationships developed between analysts and managers by investigating analyst coverage decisions in the context of CEO and CFO moves between publicly listed firms. We find that top executive moves from an origin firm to a destination firm trigger analysts following the origin firm to initiate coverage of the destination firm in 10% of our sample, which is significantly higher than in a matched sample. Analyst-manager "co-migration" is significantly stronger when both firms are within the same industry. Analysts who move with managers to the destination firm exhibit more intense and accurate coverage of the origin firm than they do in other firms and compared to other analysts covering the origin firm. The advantage no longer holds after the executive's departure, and most of the analysts' advantage does not carry over to the destination firm. However, the analysts do increase the overall market capitalization of firms in their coverage portfolio. Our results hold after Regulation Fair Disclosure, suggesting that these relationships are not based on selective disclosure. Overall, the evidence shows both the importance and limitations of professional relations in capital markets.Publication Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation(Elsevier, 2014) Brochet, Francois; Srinivasan, SurajWe examine which independent directors are held accountable when investors sue firms for financial- and disclosure-related fraud. Investors can name independent directors as defendants in lawsuits, and they can vote against their re-election to express displeasure over the directors' ineffectiveness at monitoring managers. In a sample of securities class-action lawsuits from 1996 to 2010, about 11% of independent directors are named as defendants. The likelihood of being named is greater for audit committee members and directors who sell stock during the class period. Named directors receive more negative recommendations from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), a proxy advisory firm, and significantly more negative votes from shareholders than directors in a benchmark sample. They are also more likely than other independent directors to leave sued firms. Overall, shareholders use litigation along with director elections and director retention to hold some independent directors more accountable than others when firms experience financial fraud.Publication Managers’ cultural background and disclosure attributes(2017-03-23) Brochet, Francois; Miller, Gregory S.; Naranjo, Patricia; Yu, Gwen GwenWe examine how a manager’s ethnic cultural background affects managers’ communication with investors. Using a sample of earnings conference calls transcripts with 26,430 executives from 42 countries, we find that managers from ethnic groups that have a more individualistic culture (i) use a more optimistic tone, (ii) exhibit greater self-reference, and (iii) make fewer apologies in their disclosure narratives. Managers’ ethnic culture has a lasting effect on their narratives—the effects persist even for executives who are later exposed to different ethnic cultures through work experience. The effect of ethnic heritage is observed in dialogues that reflect real time interactions (i.e., Q&As) and less pronounced in the scripted, less spontaneous portion of the calls (i.e., management discussion). The capital market responds positively to optimistic tone yet does not distinguish between the optimism in tone of managers from different ethnic backgrounds. The findings suggest that managers’ ethnic backgrounds have a significant effect on how they communicate with the capital markets and how the markets respond to the disclosure event.Publication Causes and consequences of linguistic complexity in non-U.S. firm conference calls(2012-10-10) Brochet, Francois; Naranjo, Patricia; Yu, Gwen GwenWe examine the determinants and capital market consequences of linguistic complexity in conference calls held in English by non-U.S. firms. We find that linguistic complexity is positively associated with the language barrier in the firms’ home country. Also, linguistic complexity in firms’ conference calls affects the extent to which the capital market reacts to the information releases. Firms with more linguistic complexity in their conference calls show less trading volume and price movement following the information releases, after controlling for the actual earnings news. Further, the capital market’s response to linguistic complexity is more pronounced when there is greater implicit (as captured by the presence of foreign investors) or explicit (as captured by how actively analysts ask questions) demand for the English conference calls. This suggests that the form in which financial information is presented can impose additional processing costs by limiting investors’ ability to interpret the reported financials.Publication Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Financial Statement Comparability(2012-08-31) Brochet, Francois; Jagolinzer, Alan D.; Reidl, Edward J.This study examines whether mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) leads to capital market benefits through enhanced financial statement comparability. UK domestic standards are considered very similar to IFRS (Bae et al. 2008), suggesting any capital market benefits observed for UK-domiciled firms are more likely attributable to improvements in comparability (i.e., better precision of across-firm information) than to changes in information quality specific to the firm (i.e., core information quality). If IFRS adoption improves financial statement comparability, we predict this should reduce insiders' ability to benefit from private information. Consistent with these expectations, we find that abnormal returns to insider purchases―used to proxy for private information―are reduced following IFRS adoption. Similar results obtain across numerous subsamples and proxies used to isolate IFRS effects attributable to comparability. Together, the findings are consistent with mandatory IFRS adoption improving comparability and thus leading to capital market benefits by reducing insiders' ability to exploit private information.