Person:

Gaesser, Brendan

Studies on memory, imagination, and empathy have largely progressed in isolation. Consequently, humans’ empathic tendencies to care about and help other people are considered independent of our ability to remember and imagine events. Despite this theoretical autonomy, work from across psychology, and neuroscience suggests that these cognitive abilities may be linked. In the present paper, I tentatively propose that humans’ ability to vividly imagine specific events (as supported by constructive memory) may facilitate prosocial intentions and behavior. Evidence of a relationship between memory, imagination, and empathy comes from research that shows imagination influences the perceived and actual likelihood an event occurs, improves intergroup relations, and shares a neural basis with memory and empathy. Although many questions remain, this paper outlines a new direction for research that investigates the role of imagination in promoting empathy and prosocial behavior.

Episodic simulation refers to the construction of imagined, hypothetical events that might occur in one's personal future. Damage to our capacity for episodic simulation can produce grave consequences, impairing our ability to anticipate, plan, and prepare for the future. New theoretical approaches have begun to uncover the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying episodic simulation, but much remains to be examined. The purpose of this dissertation is to further investigate the mechanisms supporting episodic simulation as well as the functions it serves. In the first study of the dissertation I examine age-related deficits in imagining the future, remembering the past, and describing the present (Paper 1). These findings replicate known deficits in older adults in episodic simulation and memory, yet provide evidence of non-episodic processes that also shape their expression. I next examine component cognitive and neural processes that are recruited to generate imagined events (Paper 2). Distinct regions of the hippocampus were active when encoding, tracking novelty, or constructing imagined events, suggesting a multifaceted role of the hippocampus in supporting episodic simulation. Finally, I present evidence that episodic simulation and memory can be used to facilitate empathy, that is, intentions to help a person in need (Paper 3). People are more willing to help a person in need after imagining or remembering helping that individual. Furthermore, the episodic vividness of these imagined or remembered events heightened intentions to help. These findings elucidate a previously unconsidered mechanism for facilitating empathy, and, in doing so, open the possibility for a new functional account of episodic simulation. I close by discussing the promise of this line of work that aims to provide new insights into the relationship between episodic simulation, memory, and empathy.