Person:

Alvarez, George

Visual long-term memory can store thousands of objects with surprising visual detail, but just how detailed are these representations, and how can one quantify this fidelity? Using the property of color as a case study, we estimated the precision of visual information in long-term memory, and compared this with the precision of the same information in working memory. Observers were shown real-world objects in random colors and were asked to recall the colors after a delay. We quantified two parameters of performance: the variability of internal representations of color (fidelity) and the probability of forgetting an object’s color altogether. Surprisingly, the fidelity of color information in long-term memory was comparable to the asymptotic precision of working memory. These results suggest that long-term memory and working memory may be constrained by a common limit, such as a bound on the fidelity required to retrieve a memory representation.

Previous studies have shown independent attentional selection of targets in the left and right visual hemifields during attentional tracking (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2005) but not during a visual search (Luck, Hillyard, Mangun, & Gazzaniga, 1989). Here we tested whether multifocal spatial attention is the critical process that operates independently in the two hemifields. It is explicitly required in tracking (attend to a subset of object locations, suppress the others) but not in the standard visual search task (where all items are potential targets). We used a modified visual search task in which observers searched for a target within a subset of display items, where the subset was selected based on location (Experiments 1 and 3A) or based on a salient feature difference (Experiments 2 and 3B). The results show hemifield independence in this subset visual search task with location-based selection but not with feature-based selection; this effect cannot be explained by general difficulty (Experiment 4). Combined, these findings suggest that hemifield independence is a signature of multifocal spatial attention and highlight the need for cognitive and neural theories of attention to account for anatomical constraints on selection mechanisms.

Are real-world objects represented as bound units? Although a great deal of research has examined binding between the feature dimensions of simple shapes, little work has examined whether the featural properties of real-world objects are stored in a single unitary object representation. In a first experiment, we found that information about an object's color is forgotten more rapidly than the information about an object's state (e.g., open, closed), suggesting that observers do not forget objects as entirely bound units. In a second and third experiment, we examined whether state and exemplar information are forgotten separately or together. If these properties are forgotten separately, the probability of getting one feature correct should be independent of whether the other feature was correct. We found that after a short delay, observers frequently remember both state and exemplar information about the same objects, but after a longer delay, memory for the two properties becomes independent. This indicates that information about object state and exemplar are forgotten separately over time. We thus conclude that real-world objects are not represented in a single unitary representation in visual memory.

Observers can store thousands of object images in visual long-term memory with high fidelity, but the fidelity of scene representations in long-term memory is not known. Here, we probed scene-representation fidelity by varying the number of studied exemplars in different scene categories and testing memory using exemplar-level foils. Observers viewed thousands of scenes over 5.5 hr and then completed a series of forced-choice tests. Memory performance was high, even with up to 64 scenes from the same category in memory. Moreover, there was only a 2% decrease in accuracy for each doubling of the number of studied scene exemplars. Surprisingly, this degree of categorical interference was similar to the degree previously demonstrated for object memory. Thus, although scenes have often been defined as a superset of objects, our results suggest that scenes and objects may be entities at a similar level of abstraction in visual long-term memory.

Many everyday tasks require us to track moving objects with attention. The demand for attention increases both when more targets are tracked and when the targets move faster. These 2 aspects of attention—assigning multiple attentional foci (or indices) to targets and monitoring each focus with precision—may tap into different cognitive and brain mechanisms. In this study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to quantify the response profile of dorsal attentional areas to variations in the number of attentional foci and their spatiotemporal precision. Subjects were asked to track a specific spoke of either 1 or 2 pinwheels that rotated at various speeds. Their tracking performance declined both when more pinwheels were tracked and when the tracked pinwheels rotated faster. However, posterior parietal activity increased only when subjects tracked more pinwheels but remained flat when they tracked faster moving pinwheels. The frontal eye fields and early visual areas increased activity when there were more targets and when the targets rotated faster. These results suggest that the posterior parietal cortex is specifically involved in indexing independently moving targets with attention but not in monitoring each focus with precision.

When a warrior picks up a sword for battle, do sword and soldier become one? The notion of an extended sense of the body has been the topic of philosophical discussion for more than a century and more recently has been subjected to empirical tests by psychologists and neuroscientists. We used a unique afterimage paradigm to test if, and under what conditions, objects are integrated into an extended body sense. Our experiments provide empirical support for the notion that objects can be integrated into an extended sense of the body. Our findings further indicate that this extended body sense is highly plastic, quickly assimilating objects that are in physical contact with the observer. Finally, we show that this extended body sense is limited to first-order extensions, thus constraining how far one can extend oneself into the environment.

Humans have a massive capacity to store detailed information in visual long-term memory. The present studies explored the fidelity of these visual long-term memory representations and examined how conceptual and perceptual features of object categories support this capacity. Observers viewed 2,800 object images with a different number of exemplars presented from each category. At test, observers indicated which of 2 exemplars they had previously studied. Memory performance was high and remained quite high (82% accuracy) with 16 exemplars from a category in memory, demonstrating a large memory capacity for object exemplars. However, memory performance decreased as more exemplars were held in memory, implying systematic categorical interference. Object categories with conceptually distinctive exemplars showed less interference in memory as the number of exemplars increased. Interference in memory was not predicted by the perceptual distinctiveness of exemplars from an object category, though these perceptual measures predicted visual search rates for an object target among exemplars. These data provide evidence that observers' capacity to remember visual information in long-term memory depends more on conceptual structure than perceptual distinctiveness.

Loud bangs, bright flashes, and intense shocks capture attention, but other changes—even those of similar magnitude—can go unnoticed. Demonstrations of change blindness have shown that observers fail to detect substantial alterations to a scene when distracted by an irrelevant flash, or when the alterations happen gradually [ 1–5 ]. Here, we show that objects changing in hue, luminance, size, or shape appear to stop changing when they move. This motion-induced failure to detect change, silencing, persists even though the observer attends to the objects, knows that they are changing, and can make veridical judgments about their current state. Silencing demonstrates the tight coupling of motion and object appearance.

Working memory is a mental storage system that keeps task-relevant information accessible for a brief span of time, and it is strikingly limited. Its limits differ substantially across people but are assumed to be fixed for a given person. Here we show that there is substantial variability in the quality of working memory representations within an individual. This variability can be explained neither by fluctuations in attention or arousal over time, nor by uneven distribution of a limited mental commodity. Variability of this sort is inconsistent with the assumptions of the standard cognitive models of working memory capacity, including both slot- and resource-based models, and so we propose a new framework for understanding the limitations of working memory: a stochastic process of degradation that plays out independently across memories.

The muscles that control the pupil are richly innervated by the autonomic nervous system. While there are central pathways that drive pupil dilations in relation to arousal, there is no anatomical evidence that cortical centers involved with visual selective attention innervate the pupil. In this study, we show that such connections must exist. Specifically, we demonstrate a novel Pupil Frequency Tagging (PFT) method, where oscillatory changes in stimulus brightness over time are mirrored by pupil constrictions and dilations. We find that the luminance–induced pupil oscillations are enhanced when covert attention is directed to the flicker stimulus and when targets are correctly detected in an attentional tracking task. These results suggest that the amplitudes of pupil responses closely follow the allocation of focal visual attention and the encoding of stimuli. PFT provides a new opportunity to study top–down visual attention itself as well as identifying the pathways and mechanisms that support this unexpected phenomenon.