Person:

Alvarez, George

Is content addressable in the representation that subserves performance in multiple-object-tracking (MOT) experiments? We devised an MOT variant that featured unique, nameable objects (cartoon animals) as stimuli. There were two possible response modes: standard, in which observers were asked to report the locations of all target items, and specific, in which observers had to report the location of a particular object (e.g., "Where is the zebra?"). A measure of capacity derived from accuracy allowed for comparisons of the results between conditions. We found that capacity in the specific condition (1.4 to 2.6 items across several experiments) was always reliably lower than capacity in the standard condition (2.3 to 3.4 items). Observers could locate specific objects, indicating a content-addressable representation. However, capacity differences between conditions, as well as differing responses to the experimental manipulations, suggest that there may be two separate systems involved in tracking, one carrying only positional information, and one carrying identity information as well.

A change detection task was used to estimate the visual short-term memory storage capacity for either the orientation or the size of objects. On each trial, several objects were briefly presented, followed by a blank inter- val and then by a second display of objects that either was identical to the first display or had a single object that was different (the object changed either orientation or size, in separate experiments). The task was to indicate whether the two displays were the same or different, and the number of objects remembered was estimated from the percent correct on this task. Storage capacity for a feature was nearly twice as large when that feature was de- fined by the object boundary, rather than by the surface texture of the object. This dramatic difference in storage capacity suggests that a particular feature (e.g., right tilted or small) is not stored in memory with an invariant abstract code. Instead, there appear to be different codes for the boundary and surface features of objects, and memory operates on boundary features more efficiently than it operates on surface features.

The ability to divide attention enables people to keep track of up to four independently moving objects. We now show that this tracking capacity is independently constrained in the left and right visual fields as if separate tracking systems were engaged, one in each field. Specifically, twice as many targets can be successfully tracked when they are divided between the left and right hemifields as when they are all presented within the same hemifield. This finding places broad constraints on the anatomy and mechanisms of attentive tracking, ruling out a single attentional focus, even one that moves quickly from target to target.

The representation of visual information inside the focus of attention is precise relative to the representation of information outside the focus of attention. We find that the visual system can compensate for the cost of withdrawing attention by pooling noisy local features and computing summary statistics. The location of an individual object is a local feature, while the center of mass of several objects (centroid) is a summary feature representing the mean object location. Three Experiments showed that withdrawing attention degraded the representation of individual positions more than the representation of the centroid. It appears that information outside the focus of attention can be represented at an abstract level which lacks local detail, but nevertheless carries a precise statistical summary of the scene. The term “ensemble features” refers to a broad class of statistical summary features, which we propose collectively comprise the representation of information outside the focus of attention.

Influential models of visual working memory treat each item to be stored as an independent unit and assume that there are no interactions between items. However, real-world displays have structure that provides higher-order constraints on the items to be remembered. Even a display with simple colored circles contains statistics, such as the mean circle size, that can be computed by observers to provide an overall summary of the display. We examined the influence of such an ensemble statistic on visual working memory. We report evidence that the remembered size of each individual item in a display is biased toward the mean size of the set of items in the same color and the mean size of all items in the display. This suggests that visual working memory is constructive, encoding displays at multiple levels of abstraction and integrating across these levels, rather than maintaining a veridical representation of each item independently.

Is visual attention required for visual consciousness? In the past decade, many have claimed that awareness can arise in the absence of attention. This claim is largely based on the notion that natural scene (or "gist") perception occurs without attention. Against this, we first show that when observers perform a variety of demanding, sustained attention tasks, inattentional blindness occurs for natural scenes. In addition, scene perception is impaired under dual-task conditions, but only when using sufficiently demanding tasks. This suggests that previous studies claiming to have demonstrated scene perception without attention failed to fully engage attention and that natural scene perception does indeed require attention. Thus, natural scene perception is not a preattentive process and cannot be used to support the idea of awareness without attention.

Do voluntary and task-driven shifts of attention have the same time course? In order to measure the time needed to voluntarily shift attention, we devised several novel visual search tasks that elicited multiple sequential attentional shifts. Participants could only respond correctly if they attended to the right place at the right time. In control conditions, search tasks were similar but participants were not required to shift attention in any order. Across five experiments, voluntary shifts of attention required 200–300 ms. Control conditions yielded estimates of 35–100 ms for task-driven shifts. We suggest that the slower speed of voluntary shifts reflects the “clock speed of free will”. Wishing to attend to something takes more time than shifting attention in response to sensory input.

The information that individuals can hold in working memory is quite limited, but researchers have typically studied this capacity using simple objects or letter strings with no associations between them. However, in the real world there are strong associations and regularities in the input. In an information theoretic sense, regularities introduce redundancies that make the input more compressible. The current study shows that observers can take advantage of these redundancies, enabling them to remember more items in working memory. In 2 experiments, covariance was introduced between colors in a display so that over trials some color pairs were more likely to appear than other color pairs. Observers remembered more items from these displays than from displays where the colors were paired randomly. The improved memory performance cannot be explained by simply guessing the high-probability color pair, suggesting that observers formed more efficient representations to remember more items. Further, as observers learned the regularities, their working memory performance improved in a way that is quantitatively predicted by a Bayesian learning model and optimal encoding scheme. These results suggest that the underlying capacity of the individuals’ working memory is unchanged, but the information they have to remember can be encoded in a more compressed fashion.