Person:

McNally, Richard

Background: A major symptom of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID; formerly Multiple Personality Disorder) is dissociative amnesia, the inability to recall important personal information. Only two case studies have directly addressed autobiographical memory in DID. Both provided evidence suggestive of dissociative amnesia. The aim of the current study was to objectively assess transfer of autobiographical information between identities in a larger sample of DID patients. Methods: Using a concealed information task, we assessed recognition of autobiographical details in an amnesic identity. Eleven DID patients, 27 normal controls, and 23 controls simulating DID participated. Controls and simulators were matched to patients on age, education level, and type of autobiographical memory tested. Findings: Although patients subjectively reported amnesia for the autobiographical details included in the task, the results indicated transfer of information between identities. Conclusion: The results call for a revision of the DID definition. The amnesia criterion should be modified to emphasize its subjective nature.

Social Phobics exhibit an attentional bias for threat in probe detection and probe discrimination paradigms. Attention training programs, whereby probes always replace nonthreat cues, reduce attentional bias for threat and self-reported anxiety. However, it remains unclear whether the therapeutic benefits of attention training result from people learning to disengage attention from threat cues or acquiring greater control over their attention by learning to deploy it flexibly. Moreover, researchers have seldom taken behavioral measures, and have never taken physiological measures of fear reduction. Investigating these questions, we found that training to disengage attention from threat is more effective than training to deploy it flexibly in social phobia. Indeed, the former condition reduced self-report, behavioral and physiological measures of anxiety.

The most methodologically rigorous epidemiological study on American military personnel deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan found that 4.3% of troops developed posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Among deployed combatants, 7.6% developed PTSD, whereas 1.4% of deployed noncombatants did so. The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs has launched a program ensuring that all veterans with PTSD will receive evidence-based cognitive-behavioral therapy, and the Army has developed Battlemind postdeployment early interventions that reduce risk for the disorder.

Background: The diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) requires exposure to a traumatic stressor, as defined by Criterion A in the DSM criteria for PTSD. Yet, over the course of successive revisions of the diagnostic manual, the range of qualifying stressors has expanded considerably (e.g., watching terrorist attacks on television). Moreover, stressors that fall short of qualifying for even an expanded Criterion A can produce apparent PTSD. Taken together, these findings imply that people who do satisfy symptomatic criteria for PTSD following exposure to less severe stressors carry a heavy burden of risk factors. Method: To test this hypothesis, we examined whether the association between the risk factor of lower intelligence and more severe PTSD and depression symptoms would be greater among women reporting less severe CSA (n = 15) relative to women who reported moderate (n = 54) or high (n = 31) severity CSA. Results: The evidence was consistent with this hypothesis for subjects in the low and moderate severity groups, but less so for those in the high severity group. Conclusions: Lower intelligence was a more potent risk factor for posttraumatic distress among people exposed to less severe relative to moderately severe stressors.

Complicated grief (CG) is a bereavement-specific syndrome chiefly characterized by symptoms of persistent separation distress. Physiological reactivity to reminders of the loss and repeated acute pangs or waves of severe anxiety and psychological pain are prominent features of CG. Fear of this grief-related physiological arousal may contribute to CG by increasing the distress associated with grief reactions and increasing the likelihood of maladaptive coping strategies and grief-related avoidance. Here, we examined anxiety sensitivity (AS; i.e., the fear of anxiety-related sensations) in two studies of bereaved adults with and without CG. In both studies, bereaved adults with CG exhibited elevated AS relative to those without CG. In study 2, AS was positively associated with CG symptom severity among those with CG. These findings are consistent with the possibility that AS contributes to the development or maintenance of CG symptoms.

Background and objectives: Memories enter a labile state during recollection. Thus, memory changes that occur during recollection can affect future instances of its activation. Having subjects perform a secondary task that taxes working memory while they recall a negative emotional memory often reduces its vividness and emotional intensity during subsequent recollections. However, researchers have not manipulated the emotional valence of the secondary task itself. Methods: Subjects viewed a video depicting the aftermath of three fatal road traffic accidents, establishing the same negative emotional memory for all subjects. We then tested their memory for the video after randomly assigning them to no secondary task or a delayed match-to-sample secondary task involving photographs of positive, negative, or neutral emotional valence. Results: The positive secondary task reduced memory for details about the video, whereas negative and neutral tasks did not. Limitations: We did not assess the vividness and emotionality of the subjects’ memory of the video. Conclusions: Having subjects recall a stressful experience while performing a positively valent secondary task can decrement details of the memory and perhaps its emotionality.

Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is a common psychiatric disorder characterized by a persistent, excessive fear and avoidance of social and performance situations. Research on cognitive biases indicates individuals with SAD may lack an accurate view of how they are perceived by others, especially in social situations when they allocate important attentional resources to monitoring their own actions as well as external threat. In the present study, we explored whether socially anxious individuals also have impairments in theory of mind (ToM), or the ability to comprehend others’ mental states, including emotions, beliefs, and intentions. Forty socially anxious and 40 non-socially-anxious comparison participants completed two ToM tasks: the Reading the Mind in the Eyes and the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition. Participants with SAD performed worse on ToM tasks than did non-socially-anxious participants. Relative to comparison participants, those with SAD were more likely to attribute more intense emotions and greater meaning to what others were thinking and feeling. These group differences were not due to interpretation bias. The ToM impairments in people with SAD are in the opposite direction of those in people with autism spectrum conditions whose inferences about the mental states of other people are absent or very limited. This association between SAD and ToM may have important implications for our understanding of both the maintenance and treatment of social anxiety disorder.