Person: Meir, Reshef
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Publication Are you Going to Do That? Contingent-Payment Mechanisms to Improve Coordination
(2015) Ma, Hongyao; Meir, Reshef; Parkes, David; Zou, JamesIn this extended abstract, we consider simple coordination problems, such as allocating the right to use a shared sports facility in a way that maximizes its usage, or picking the time of a meeting in a way that maximizes attendance. More generally, an alternative is selected by a mechanism in period zero based on reports from agents. This induces a decision problem facing agents in the next period (e.g., to use a resource, or to attend a meeting.) Outcomes are designated as either good or bad, and the design goal is to maximize the probability of good outcomes. For example, a good outcome may be the resource being used, or having enough people attend a meeting.