Person:
Allen, Abigail

Profile Picture

Email Address

AA Acceptance Date

Birth Date

Research Projects

Organizational Units

Job Title

Last Name

Allen

First Name

Abigail

Name

Allen, Abigail
Author's Publications: search.filters.isAuthorOfPublication.baf84e1a-a120-4dfc-b9a9-aba7449cba7d

Search Results

Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
  • Thumbnail Image
    Publication
    Towards an Understanding of the Role of Standard Setters in Standard Setting
    (Elsevier, 2013) Allen, Abigail; Ramanna, Karthik
    We investigate the effect of standard setters in standard setting: we examine how certain professional and political characteristics of FASB members and SEC commissioners predict the accounting "reliability" and "relevance" of proposed standards. Notably, we find FASB members with backgrounds in financial services are more likely to propose standards that decrease "reliability" and increase "relevance," partly due to their tendency to propose fair-value methods. We find opposite results for FASB members affiliated with the Democratic Party, although only when excluding a financial-services background as an independent variable. Jackknife procedures show that results are robust to omitting any individual standard setter.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Publication
    Agenda Setting at the FASB: Evidence from the Role of the FASAC
    (2014-12-08) Allen, Abigail
    I examine the extent to which the FASB’s agenda determination is a function of the contemporaneous preferences of its primary constituents: auditors, preparers, and financial statement users. Using the FASB’s consultation with the FASAC as a lens through which to view constituent preferences, I find evidence that from 1982 to 2001 influence on FASB agenda decisions is concentrated among “Big N” audit firms, whereas from 2002 to 2006 the preferences of financial constituents appear most significant. Across both periods, I find no evidence of significant preparer influence in agenda formation, which is in contrast to their documented role in later stages of standard setting. Collectively, the results contribute to our understanding of the influence of constituents in standard setting and highlight a shift in that influence over time.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Publication
    Lobbying Behavior of Governmental Entities: Evidence from Public Pension Accounting Rules
    (2014-12-08) Allen, Abigail; Petacchi, Reining
    We examine the lobbying behavior of state governments in the development of recently issued public pension accounting standards GASB 67 and 68. Consistent with opportunistic motivations, we find that states’ opposition to the liability increasing provisions embedded in these standards is increasing in the severity of pension plan underfunding, state budget deficits, and the use of high discount rates. Further we find opposing states are subject to more stringent balanced budget requirements and greater political pressure from unions. By contrast, we find evidence that the support from financial statement users for these provisions is amplified in states with poorly funded plans and large budget deficits, suggesting government lobbying is misaligned with a public interest perspective. We also find evidence that user support varies by type: internal users (public employees) overwhelmingly oppose the standards, relative to external users (credit analysts and the broader citizenry) but the difference is moderated in states with constitutionally protected benefits. This finding is consistent with the expectation that pension accounting reform will motivate cuts in pension benefits as opposed to increased levels of funding from the governments. Analyses of 2011 and 2012 state pension reforms confirm that states opposed to accounting reform are more likely to cut pension benefits.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Publication
    Auditor Lobbying on Accounting Standards
    (2015-01-20) Allen, Abigail; Ramanna, Karthik; Roychowdhury, Sugata
    We examine how Big N auditors’ changing incentives impact their comment-letter lobbying on U.S. GAAP over the first thirty-four years of the FASB (1973–2006). We examine the influence of auditors’ lobbying incentives arising from three basic factors: managing expected litigation and regulatory costs; catering to clients’ preferences for flexibility in GAAP; and being conceptually aligned with the FASB, particularly on the use of fair values in accounting. We find evidence that auditor lobbying is driven by prevailing standards of litigation and regulatory scrutiny and by support for fair-value accounting. But we find no evidence that catering to clients’ preferences for flexibility in GAAP drives auditor lobbying. Broadly, our paper offers the first large-sample descriptive analysis of the role of Big N auditors in the accounting standard-setting process.