Person:

Heymann, Philip

I was asked to speak about corruption and democracy. I have a long history of concern about that relationship. The subject of corruption and democracy is best broken into three separate areas. First, there are questions of corruption that have no special relationship to democracy at all. Still, they present very important practical and moral issues which I will identify. Second, I will examine the particular relationships of corruption and democracy. Third, I will review the democratic means for fighting the problem of corruption.

This is a chapter from our forthcoming book, 'Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists: Lessons from the War on Terrorism', (MIT Press, September 2010). This chapter addresses the legal, ethical, and strategic aspects of targeted killings as a counterterrorism measure, drawing on the American and Israeli experience. We argue that since terrorism is neither a traditional war nor a traditional crime, its non-traditional nature must affect how, where, and when we employ targeted killings. Specifically, we argue that whether one begins with a law enforcement model or a war model in mind, the ultimate contours of justifiable targeted killings are very similar under either paradigm.

This is a chapter from our forthcoming book, 'Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists: Lessons from the War on Terrorism', (MIT Press, September 2010). This chapter addresses the legal, ethical, and strategic aspects of targeted killings as a counterterrorism measure, drawing on the American and Israeli experience. We argue that since terrorism is neither a traditional war nor a traditional crime, its non-traditional nature must affect how, where, and when we employ targeted killings. Specifically, we argue that whether one begins with a law enforcement model or a war model in mind, the ultimate contours of justifiable targeted killings are very similar under either paradigm.

On April 15, 2013, at 2:49 pm, an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated near the finish line of the Boston Marathon. Three people died, and more than 260 others needed hospital care, many having lost limbs or suffered horrific wounds. Those explosions began about 100 hours of intense drama that riveted the attention of the nation. The response by emergency medical, emergency management, and law enforcement agencies and by the public at large has now become known colloquially as ”Boston Strong.” This report, through analysis of selected aspects of the Marathon events, seeks lessons that can help response organizations in Boston and other locales improve preparation both for emergencies that may occur at ”fixed” events like the Marathon and for ”no notice” events like those that began with the murder of Officer Collier at MIT and concluded the next day with the apprehension of the alleged perpetrators in Watertown.