Person:

Rogoff, Kenneth

This paper explores the menu of options for renormalizing public debt levels relative to nominal activity in the long run, should governments eventually decide to do so. Although debt ratios may need to rise further in some cases, a vision of longer-term options is key to weighing alternative medium-term stabilization strategies. Orthodox ones, the standard fare of officialdom, include enhancing growth, running primary budget surpluses, and privatizing government assets. Heterodox polices include restructuring debt contracts, generating unexpected inflation, taxing wealth, and repressing private finance. Advanced countries have relied far more on heterodox approaches than many observers choose to remember.

The concept of "exorbitant privilege" has received great attention from policy makers as well as academics worldwide. The idea originally referred to the willingness of foreigners to hold large quantities of US government debt at extremely low interest rates, due to the dollar's world reserve currency status. In recent years, the term exorbitant privilege has been expanded to explain why the US appears to be enjoying excess return from its external assets over liabilities across all asset classes, including foreign direct investment, equities and other forms of portfolio investment. In this paper, we give a brief review of the recent literature on exorbitant privilege, and then proceed to discuss exorbitant privilege in the context of another country, Japan, which has been the world's largest creditor nation for more than two decades. In contrast to the common perception that Japan has been a particularly poor international investor, we find that Japan enjoys exorbitant privilege in both the broad and narrow sense. Japan also earns higher expected returns from maturity transformation. Thus although the dollar is the reserve currency, the yen also has enjoyed a safe haven effect in the recent period.

The Federal Reserve's mandate has evolved considerably over the organization's hundred-year history. It was changed from an initial focus in 1913 on financial stability, to fiscal financing in World War II and its aftermath, to a strong anti-inflation focus from the late 1970s, and then back to greater emphasis on financial stability since the Great Contraction. Yet, as the Fed's mandate has expanded in recent years, its range of instruments has narrowed, partly based on a misguided belief in the inherent stability of financial markets. We argue for a return to multiple instruments, including a more active role for reserve requirements.

We show that "commodity currency" exchange rates have remarkably robust power in predicting global commodity prices, both in-sample and out-of-sample, and against a variety of alternative benchmarks. This result is of particular interest to policymakers, given the lack of deep forward markets in many individual commodities, and broad aggregate commodity indices in particular. We also explore the reverse relationship (commodity prices forecasting exchange rates) but find it to be notably less robust. We o§er a theoretical resolution, based on the fact that exchange rates are strongly forward looking, whereas commodity price fluctuations are typically more sensitive to short-term demand imbalances.

Despite advances in transactions technologies, paper currency still constitutes a notable percentage of the money supply in most countries. For example, it constitutes roughly 10% of the US Federal Reserve’s main monetary aggregate, M2. Yet, it has important drawbacks. First, it can help facilitate activity in the underground (tax-evading) and illegal economy. Second, its existence creates the artifact of the zero bound on the nominal interest rate. On the other hand, the enduring popularity of paper currency generates many benefits, including substantial seigniorage revenue. This paper explores some of the issues associated with phasing out paper currency, especially large-denomination notes.

This paper uses an infinite-horizon model based on individual maximizing behavior to study whether explosive price-level paths unrelated to monetary growth--speculative hyperinflations--can be equilibrium paths under rational expectations. In a pure fiat money regime, speculative hyperinflations can be excluded only through severe restrictions on individual preferences; but when the government fractionally backs the currency by guaranteeing a minimal real redemption value for money, speculative hyperinflations are impossible, even if agents are not completely certain that they can redeem their money in any given period. The analysis also confirms that implosive price-level paths and divergent paths for capital asset prices are not equilibria under either monetary regime.

We present a dynamic model of international lending in which borrowers cannot commit to future repayments and in which debtors can sometimes successfully negotiate partial defaults or "rescheduling agreements." All parties in a debt rescheduling negotiation realize that today's rescheduling agreement may itself have to be renegotiated in the future. Our bargaining-theoretic approach allows us to handle the effects of uncertainty on sovereign debt contracts in a much more satisfactory way than in earlier analyses. The framework is readily extended to analyze the conflicting interests of different lenders and of banks and creditor country taxpayers.

It is well-known that if international linkages are relatively small, the potential gains to international monetary policy coordination are typically quite limited. But when goods and financial markets are tightly linked, is it problematic if countries unilaterally design their monetary policy rules? Are the stabilization gains from having separate currencies largely squandered in the absence of effective international monetary coordination? We argue that under plausible assumptions the answer is no. Unless risk aversion is very high, lack of coordination in rule setting is a second-order problem compared with the overall gains from macroeconomic stabilization.