Person: Jain, Shaili
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Jain
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Shaili
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Jain, Shaili
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Publication Designing incentives for online question-and-answer forums(Elsevier BV, 2014) Jain, Shaili; Chen, Yiling; Parkes, DavidWe provide a game-theoretic model of sequential information aggregation motivated by online question-and-answer forums. An asker posts a question and each user decides when to aggregate a unique piece of information with existing information. When the quality exceeds a certain threshold, the asker closes the question and allocates points to users. We consider the effect of different rules for allocating points on the equilibrium behavior. A best-answer rule provides a unique, efficient equilibrium in which all users respond in the first round, for substitutes valuations over information. However, the best-answer rule isolates the least efficient equilibrium for complements valuations. We demonstrate alternate scoring rules that provide an efficient equilibrium for distinct subclasses of complements valuations, and retain an efficient equilibrium for substitutes valuations. We introduce a reasonable set of axioms, and establish that no rule satisfying these axioms can achieve the efficient outcome in a unique equilibrium for all valuations.Publication Designing Incentives for Online Question and Answer Forums(Association for Computing Machinery, 2009) Jain, Shaili; Chen, Yiling; Parkes, DavidIn this paper, we provide a simple game-theoretic model of an online question and answer forum. We focus on factual questions in which user responses aggregate while a question remains open. Each user has a unique piece of information and can decide when to report this information. The asker prefers to receive information sooner rather than later, and will stop the process when satisfied with the cumulative value of the posted information. We consider two distinct cases: a complements case, in which each successive piece of information is worth more to the asker than the previous one; and a substitutes case, in which each successive piece of information is worth less than the previous one. A best-answer scoring rule is adopted to model Yahoo! Answers, and is effective for substitutes information, where it isolates an equilibrium in which all users respond in the first round. But we find that this rule is ineffective for complements information, isolating instead an equilibrium in which all users respond in the final round. In addressing this, we demonstrate that an approval-voting scoring rule and a proportional-share scoring rule can enable the most efficient equilibrium with complements information, under certain conditions, by providing incentives for early responders as well as the user who submits the final answer.Publication An Economically Principled Generative Model of AS Graph Connectivity(Association for Computing Machinery, 2007) Corbo, Jacomo; Jain, Shaili; Mitzenmacher, Michael; Parkes, DavidWe explore the problem of modeling Internet connectivity at the Autonomous System (AS) level and present an economically-principled dynamic model that reproduces key features of the AS graph structure. We view the graph as the outcome of optimizing decisions made by each AS given its business model. In our model, nodes (representing ASs) arrive over time and choose and change providers to maximize their utility. Our formulation of AS utility includes revenue from an AS’s own generated demand for traffic, congestion and routing costs, as well as transfers to and from provider and customer ASs, respectively. Our model has the following features: it uses an empirically-motivated model of traffic demand (Chang, Jamin, Mao, Willinger, 2005) which considers the variation in demand with ASs’ business models and the graph of business relationships; it allows for nodes to revise their connections over time, in a fashion similar to the well-known ‘forest fire’ model (Leskovec, Kleinberg, Faloutsos, 2005); a node’s utility explicitly models many of the major economic and technological issues at play. We validate our model-generated graphs against those of other generative models. Building on previous work that has shown that rule-based generative models like preferential attachment yield poorly-performing traffic routing graphs (Li, Alderson, Doyle, Willinger, 2006), we show that our graphs perform well as designed, engineered systems, while retaining measured statistical properties of the AS graph.Publication An Economically-Principled Generative Model of AS Graph Connectivity(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2009) Corbo, Jacomo; Jain, Shaili; Mitzenmacher, Michael; Parkes, DavidEnd-to-end packet delivery in the Internet is achieved through a system of interconnections between the network domains of independent entities called autonomous systems (ASes). Inter-domain connections are the result of a complex, dynamic process of negotiated business relationships between pairs of ASes. We present an economically-principled generative model for autonomous system graph connectivity. While there is already a large literature devoted to understanding Internet connectivity at the AS level, many of these models are either static or based on generalized stochastics.Publication A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Games with a Purpose(Springer-Verlag, 2008) Jain, Shaili; Parkes, DavidWe present a simple game-theoretic model for the ESP game, an interactive game devised to label images on the web, and characterize the equilibrium behavior of the model. We show that a simple change in the incentive structure can lead to different equilibrium structure and suggest the possibility of formal incentive design in achieving desirable system-wide outcomes, complementing existing considerations of robustness against cheating and human factors.Publication The Role of Game Theory in Human Computation Systems(Association for Computing Machinery, 2009) Jain, Shaili; Parkes, DavidThe paradigm of "human computation" seeks to harness human abilities to solve computational problems or otherwise perform distributed work that is beyond the scope of current AI technologies. One aspect of human computation has become known as "games with a purpose" and seeks to elicit useful computational work in fun (typically) multi-player games. Human computation also encompasses distributed work (or "peer production") systems such as Wikipedia and Question and Answer forums. In this short paper, we survey existing game-theoretic models for various human computation designs, and outline research challenges in advancing a theory that can enable better design.