Person:

Banaji, Mahzarin

For millennia human beings have believed that it is morally wrong to judge others by the fortuitous or unfortunate events that befall them or by the actions of another person. Rather, an individual’s own intended, deliberate actions should be the basis of his/her evaluation, reward and punishment. In a series of studies we investigate whether such rules guide the judgments of children. The first three studies demonstrate that children view lucky others as more likely than unlucky others to perform intentional good actions. Children similarly assess the siblings of lucky others as more likely to perform intentional good actions than the siblings of unlucky others. The next three studies demonstrate that children as young as 3 years believe that lucky people are nicer than unlucky people. The final two studies find that Japanese children also demonstrate a robust preference for the lucky and their associates. These findings are discussed in relation to Lerner’s just world theory and Piaget’s immanent justice research and in relation to the development of intergroup attitudes.

Determining which dimensions of social classification are culturally significant is a developmental challenge. Some suggest this is accomplished by differentially privileging intrinsic visual cues over nonintrinsic cues (Atran, 1990; Gil-White, 2001), whereas others point to the role of noun labels as more general promoters of kind-based reasoning (Bigler & Liben, 2007; Gelman, 2003). A novel groups procedure was employed to examine the independent effects of noun labels and visual cues on social categorization. Experiment 1 demonstrated that in the absence of a visual cue, a noun label supported social categorization among 4-year-olds and 7-year-olds. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that children and adults fail to differentiate between intrinsic and nonintrinsic visual cues to category membership, suggesting that this distinction is not central to the acquisition of social category concepts. Experiments 2 and 3 also showed that in the absence of a shared noun label, visual cues were not sufficient for younger children to form social categories. Experiment 4 ruled out a potential demand characteristic in the previous experiments. Together, these results reveal the primacy of verbal labels over visual cues for social categorization in young children and suggest a developmental change between ages 4 and 7 in the ability to construct new representations of social category concepts.

Are attitudes affected by the language in which they are expressed? In particular, do individual preferences shift to accord with the cultural values embedded in a given language? To examine these questions, two experiments tested bilingual participants, administering the same test of implicit attitudes in two languages. In both studies, participants manifested attitudes that favored social categories associated with the test language, e.g. more pro-Moroccan attitudes when tested in Arabic as compared with French (Study 1) and more pro-Spanish attitudes when tested in Spanish as compared with English (Study 2). The effects of language on elicited preference were large (mean d>.7), providing evidence that preferences are not merely transmitted through language but also shaped by it.

Long traditions in the social sciences have emphasized the gradual internalization of intergroup attitudes and the putatively more basic tendency to prefer the groups to which one belongs. In four experiments (N = 883) spanning two cultures and two status groups within one of those cultures, we obtained new evidence that implicit intergroup attitudes emerge in young children in a form indistinguishable from adult attitudes. Strikingly, this invariance from childhood to adulthood holds for members of socially dominant majorities, who consistently favor their in-group, as well as for members of a disadvantaged minority, who, from the early moments of race-based categorization, do not show a preference for their in-group. Far from requiring a protracted period of internalization, implicit intergroup attitudes are characterized by early enculturation and developmental invariance.

We investigated the development of three aspects of implicit social cognition (self-esteem, group identity, and group attitude) and their interrelationships in Hispanic American children (ages 5 to 12) and adults. Hispanic children and adults showed positive implicit self-esteem and a preference for and identification with their in-group when the comparison group was another disadvantaged minority group (African American). However, challenging the long-held view that children's early intergroup attitudes are primarily egocentric, young Hispanic children do not show implicit preference for or identification with their in-group when the comparison was the more advantaged White majority. Results also supported predictions of cognitive-affective balance in the youngest children. Strikingly, balance was absent in adults, suggesting that in disadvantaged minority groups, cognitive-affective consistency may actually decline with age.

Challenging the view that implicit social cognition emerges from protracted social learning, research now suggests that intergroup preferences are present at adultlike levels in early childhood. Specifically, the pattern of developmental emergence of implicit attitudes is characterized by (i) rapidly emerging implicit preferences for ingroups and dominant groups and (ii) stability of these preferences across development. Together these findings demonstrate that implicit intergroup preferences follow a developmental course distinct from explicit intergroup preferences. In addition these results cast doubt on ‘slow-learning’ models of implicit social cognition according to which children should converge on adult forms of social cognition only as statistical regularities are internalized over a lengthy period of development.

This study examined the development of implicit race attitudes in American and Japanese children and adults. Implicit ingroup bias was present early in both populations, and remained stable at each age tested (age 6, 10, and adult). Similarity in magnitude and developmental course across these 2 populations suggests that implicit intergroup bias is an early-emerging and fundamental aspect of human social cognition. However, implicit race attitudes toward favored outgroups are more positive in older than in younger participants, indicating that ‘‘cultural prestige’’ enjoyed by a group moderates implicit bias as greater knowledge of group status is acquired. These results demonstrate (a) the ready presence, (b) early cultural invariance, and (c) subsequent cultural moderation of implicit attitudes toward own and other groups.