Person: Saich, Anthony
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Saich, Anthony
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Publication Reflections on a Survey of Global Perceptions of International Leaders and World Powers(Harvard University, 2014-12) Saich, AnthonyA recent survey asks citizens from 30 countries for their views on 10 influential national leaders who have a global impact (see Appendix). There are many rich findings among the data. However, two general trends stand out. The first is that the responses are influenced by geopolitics. Differences between nations and national leaders are clearly reflected in the attitudes of their own citizens. Thus, it is plain that the tensions between China and Japan result in very poor evaluations of China and its leader by Japanese citizens and vice versa. Second, there is a correlation in responses between the nature of the political system and citizen opinions of their own nation’s leader. On the whole, in multiparty systems or genuine two-party systems such as in Europe and the U.S., citizens are more critical of their national leaders and policies than is the case in those nations where politics is less contested.Publication What Does General Secretary Xi Jinping Dream About?(Harvard University, 2017-08) Saich, AnthonyThis analysis argues that the period of easy reforms in China has ended, and the time of difficult reforms that touch core political interests has begun. The resulting challenges facing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary Xi Jinping when he is confirmed for another five-year-term span political, economic, and international spheres. This leadership must both maintain a domestic focus to strengthen economic growth and avoid the “middle-income trap,” while also engaging in a host of regional and global actions to cement China’s position on the world stage. Internally, Xi has consolidated significant political power, and this has created significant tension among vested interests and competing centers of influence. Externally, for the first time in several centuries, the largest economy in the world is not Western and will be under a leadership that does not share the same consensual values and political structures as those in the West. Xi has outlined several priorities, including: increased CCP control over state and society; the promotion of traditional Chinese culture; the importance of Marxism as a guiding principle; historical revisionism and censorship; the promotion of nationalism; and the pursuit of an aggressive national anti-corruption campaign. Given these goals and sets of challenges, the outcome in China is uncertain and there exist a range of possible scenarios. The most attractive for the West would be an increase in social diversity and an accommodation with society to form a new social compact. However, it is difficult to see what would cause the current elite willingly to reject the existing beneficial system. A more unpredictable outcome would be chaotic pluralization in which democracy is not entrenched and elites and their families continue to benefit from their political connections to privatize public wealth. An alternative over the short to medium term would be the continuation of the fluctuation of soft and harder authoritarianism that would make bold initiatives unlikely. Rarely does a transition occur during a period of economic growth and is more likely to occur with the system under stress. As a result, the emergence of an illiberal democracy would be quite plausible under this final scenario.Publication The Quality of Governance in China: The Citizen’s View(John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University., 2012) Saich, AnthonyAre China’s citizens sufficiently satisfied to reduce potential challenges to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule? It is reasonable to assume that if a significant percentage of citizens are more satisfied with government performance and the provision of public goods, the government will have a greater capacity for policy experimentation and enjoy a residual trust that may help them survive policy errors. This paper asks three sets of questions. The first set asks about the general levels of satisfaction with government across different levels. Second, we ask about how citizens view the performance of local officials in dealing with the public and in implementing policy. Third, we look at the level of satisfaction with the provision of a number of specific goods and services, with a more in-depth look at dealing with corruption. In particular, we compare responses among those who live in major cities, small towns and townships, and villages. Findings are based on a survey that was conducted together with Horizon Market Research Company in the fall of 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011. The survey is a purposive stratified survey ranging from 3,800 to 4,150 respondents selected from three administrative levels: city, town, and village. Rather than a nationwide probability sample, the survey comprises a number of sites selected on the basis of three variables: geographic location, average per capita income, and population. Survey findings reveal that the new leadership that takes power through late-2012 and 2013 is likely to inherit a mixed situation. There is clearly much dissatisfaction with the performance of local government and its officials; very few have faith that the government can deal effectively with the problem of corruption. Yet, there is still good will towards the Central government that is not identified with the problems that are seen to blight the performance of those levels of government closer to the people. The surveys confirm the view of others that Chinese citizens do “disaggregate” the state and would appear to retain faith in the central government. In addition, the satisfaction with all levels of government has risen since we began the surveys in 2003. This may give the Central leadership some cushion if it makes policy errors in the future. However, as we have seen in the recent past, seemingly stable authoritarian regimes can unravel quickly, and citizen frustration can spill out onto the streets. Our survey also suggests that citizens feel that local officials are not very effective in promoting the interests of ordinary folk, but are quite adept at pursuing their own interests. It will be a notable challenge for the new leadership to bring about significant improvement in those areas of public service citizens deem most important without increasing transparency and accountability in local government.Publication China, the USA, and Asia’s Future(John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University., 2012) Saich, AnthonyThe relationship between the US and China is at the core of both economic and geopolitical trends that will define the future of Asia in this century. China’s economic rise and its more assertive diplomacy have created a new environment for neighboring countries to react. This has necessitated other powers in Asia to work within a regional order that is no longer based on US primacy as the key guarantor of global and regional public goods. Despite relative decline, the Obama administration, first with its unwieldy phrase of a pivot to Asia and the later notion of rebalancing, has indicated clearly that it intends to retain a key role in Asia. The potential danger that this can give rise to is shown by the tension that arises periodically over territorial disputes. Most recently, there have been three unsettling trends. First, is the dispute between the Philippines and China over the Scarborough Shoal, which falls within the long tongue of the South China Seas that China claims as a “core interest.” Second, in mid-June 2012, China announced that it had set up a prefectural city, Sansha, to oversee three South China Sea islands. Third, there has been yet another escalation of sovereignty claims over the Senkaku islands between China and Japan. There have also been territorial spats between Japan and South Korea. Whether the US will be drawn into an avoidable conflict by its allies in the region or whether it will renege on its alliances to maintain a viable relationship with China heightens the insecurity. It is even more important for the US and China to find a way to cooperate in the Asia region than it is for the other countries within the region. There is no alternative leader within the region or group of countries that can provide the kind of balance that will enable the necessary public goods to be produced. This will entail modification of behavior by both the US and China, and it will not be easy. China’s strategic goals are directed to the defense of a continental power with growing maritime interests, as well as to Taiwan’s unification and other sovereignty claims and are largely conservative, not expansionist from their own perspective. China’s continued economic rise may nevertheless spawn a new security dilemma in East Asia, increasing regional instability and undermining China’s attempts at the diplomacy of reassurance. China has always shown itself willing to use force to protect what is sees as “legitimate” territorial claims. To be effective, both the US and China will have to make accommodations. China will have to define its national interest more clearly, and this will mean acknowledging that other principles of its foreign policy may be overridden under certain circumstances. China’s commercial activities have become a major issue in the domestic politics of a number of countries in the region. China needs to feel comfortable with the framework for international governance of which it is now a key member; reduce its suspicion of hostile foreign intent; and adjust its outdated notion of sovereignty to accept that some issues need transnational solutions and that international monitoring does not have to erode the Chinese Communist Party’s power.Publication Developing Social Citizenship? A Case Study of Education and Health Services in Yantian Village, Guangdong(John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2012) Saich, AnthonyThis paper uses a case study of the evolution of education and healthcare provision in Yantian Village, Guangdong Province to examine broader trends in China’s evolving social policies. It makes no claims that development in Yantian is typical for rural China but it may allow some tentative conclusions to be drawn about the extent of inclusiveness of social policy and the moves towards citizenship as a basis for redistribution policies and welfare provision. Yantian is not a normal village but rather is what people refer to as an “urban village” and it has been one of the major beneficiaries of economic reform. Lying close to Hong Kong and Shenzhen, it is in the hub of the Pearl River Delta that has become a key link in the global reorganization of manufacturing and production. The economic reforms, especially the opening to foreign investment, pursued since the late-1970s have replaced the water buffalo and rice paddies with China’s main export processing center. It has been a key center for foreign direct investment and, as a result, has attracted a large migrant community. The province of Guangdong is home to some 30 million migrants, 80,000 of whom lived in Yantian in 2010. The migrants work primarily in the 200 or so foreign invested enterprises vested in Yantian (there were over 400 at their peak). However, the group of migrants is not homogenous and this has consequences for how they are treated within the village. Investors are treated far better than those working in the factories. Most importantly, the migrants are not eligible for any payout from the dividends from the village collective that has provided the relative wealth for the local residents. The rapid development of Yantian with the influx of foreign investment and the large number of migrants who moved into the village put tremendous pressure on the educational services. This led to the emergence of a network of different types of schools catering to the varied needs within the community. The range of schools available did mean that all children in Yantian were able to find schooling irrespective of family background, but the quality and investment varied significantly. Most importantly, from 2008 the government budget covered the costs for migrant children helping overcome the biggest inequity of the previous years. Yet, differences remained with respect to the quality of the teachers and the infrastructure in the schools. As elsewhere in China, economic reforms had a major impact on medical insurance in Yantian. From the early-1980s, Yantian Village started to transform its healthcare system from one based on a collective, cooperative scheme to one where village clinics ran on contracts. This meant villagers no longer enjoyed any guarantees for healthcare provision. Some of the wealthier families purchased commercial medical insurance, while certain production teams set aside a partial fund from their collective revenues to subsidize members who suffered catastrophic or chronic disease and to provide a limited medical allowance. However, by 2000 Yantian Village had achieved universal coverage for its residents through a three-phase development.Publication The National People's Congress: Functions and Membership(Harvard University, 2015-11) Saich, AnthonyFrom time to time, the attention of the media in the United States and around world turns to China’s National People’s Congress (NPC), typically around the time the NPC meets in March. This paper is intended to provide an overview of the NPC's role in China's governmental hierarchy, its functions, and its membership.Publication Values and Vision: Perspectives on Philanthropy in 21st-Century China(Harvard University, 2016) Johnson, Paula; Saich, AnthonyValues and Vision: Perspectives on Philanthropy in 21st Century China is an exploratory study of philanthropic giving among China’s very wealthy citizens. Recognizing the increasing number of successful entrepreneurs engaged in philanthropic activity in China, the study explores the economic and policy contexts in which this philanthropy is evolving; the philanthropic motivations, aspirations and priorities of some of the country’s most engaged philanthropists; and the challenges and opportunities for increasing philanthropic engagement and impact in China.Publication What to Expect from the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party(Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, 2022-09) Saich, AnthonyOn October 16, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will convene its 20th Party Congress. Held every five years, the Congress is a critical event. While nothing is seriously debated there, the symbolic function of the Congress is extremely important. It summarizes past achievements and sets out future objectives, all while displaying an outward power and unity. The Congress brings together just over 3,000 delegates from the provinces, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and some central agencies for about a week to approve the report of the General Secretary, amendments to the party statutes, and any other documents placed before them. In theory, this sets in motion the appointment of a new leadership by electing candidates to the Central Committee (around 200 members and 150 alternates). In reality, the Congress approves the slate proposed by the outgoing Political Bureau (Politburo) and senior leader- ship. In turn, the Central Committee elects members of the Politburo, its Standing Committee, and the Secretariat, again based on lists provided after the Party leadership has finished haggling. This Congress will be special, as General Secretary Xi Jinping seeks a third term as political leader (either as general secretary or party chairman), confirms his place and ideas even more concretely within the party statutes, and seeks to appoint a leadership cohort drawn from his associates. Below, I provide my best guesstimates on his chances of reappointment, the leadership structure, and indications for future policy trends.