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Cage, Julia

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Cage

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Cage, Julia
Author's Publications: search.filters.isAuthorOfPublication.e08f32d6-e204-482c-b6fa-ff93fe44f7fe

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    Essays in the Political Economy of Information
    (2014-06-06) Cage, Julia; Nunn, Nathan; Alesina, Alberto; Hornbeck, Richard; Shleifer, Andrei
    The primary focus of this dissertation is on information, its production and dissemination in society. In the first chapter, I explore the consequences of an increase in the number of newspapers on the quantity and quality of news provided and, ultimately, changes in political participation, using a new panel of local newspaper presence and political turnout in France from 1945 to 2012. My results shed new light on the role played by consumers' heterogeneity and increasing returns to scale in news production, and have implications for the study of the relationship between media competition and political participation.
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    Taxation, Corruption, and Growth
    (Elsevier, 2016) Aghion, Philippe; Akcigit, Ufuk; Cage, Julia; Kerr, William
    We build an endogenous growth model to analyze the relationships between taxation, corruption, and economic growth. Entrepreneurs lie at the center of the model and face disincentive effects from taxation but acquire positive benefits from public infrastructure. Political corruption governs the efficiency with which tax revenues are translated into infrastructure. The model predicts an inverted-U relationship between taxation and growth, with corruption reducing the optimal taxation level. We find evidence consistent with these predictions and the entrepreneurial channel using data from the Longitudinal Business Database of the US Census Bureau. The marginal effect of taxation for growth for a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is significantly positive; on the other hand, the marginal effects of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of corruption are much lower across the board. We make progress towards causality through Granger-style tests and by considering periphery counties where effective tax policy is largely driven by bordering states. Finally, we calibrate our model and find that the calibrated taxation rate of 37% is fairly close to the model's estimated welfare maximizing taxation rate of 42%. Reducing corruption provides the largest potential impact for welfare gain through its impact on the uses of tax revenues.