Person:

Schacter, Daniel

Human cognition is increasingly characterized as an emergent property of interactions among distributed, functionally specialized brain networks. We recently demonstrated that the antagonistic “default” and “dorsal attention” networks—subserving internally and externally directed cognition, respectively—are modulated by a third “frontoparietal control” network that flexibly couples with either network depending on task domain. However, little is known about the intrinsic functional architecture underlying this relationship. We used graph theory to analyze network properties of intrinsic functional connectivity within and between these three large-scale networks. Task-based activation from three independent studies were used to identify reliable brain regions (“nodes”) of each network. We then examined pairwise connections (“edges”) between nodes, as defined by resting-state functional connectivity MRI. Importantly, we used a novel bootstrap resampling procedure to determine the reliability of graph edges. Furthermore, we examined both full and partial correlations. As predicted, there was a higher degree of integration within each network than between networks. Critically, whereas the default and dorsal attention networks shared little positive connectivity with one another, the frontoparietal control network showed a high degree of between-network interconnectivity with each of these networks. Furthermore, we identified nodes within the frontoparietal control network of three different types—default-aligned, dorsal attention-aligned, and dual-aligned—that we propose play dissociable roles in mediating internetwork communication. The results provide evidence consistent with the idea that the frontoparietal control network plays a pivotal gate-keeping role in goal-directed cognition, mediating the dynamic balance between default and dorsal attention networks.

When information is thematically related to previously studied information, gist-based processes contribute to false recognition. Using functional MRI, we examined the neural correlates of gist-based recognition as a function of increasing numbers of studied exemplars. Sixteen participants incidentally encoded small, medium, and large sets of pictures, and we compared the neural response at recognition using parametric modulation analyses. For hits, regions in middle occipital, middle temporal, and posterior parietal cortex linearly modulated their activity according to the number of related encoded items. For false alarms, visual, parietal, and hippocampal regions were modulated as a function of the encoded set size. The present results are consistent with prior work in that the neural regions supporting veridical memory also contribute to false memory for related information. The results also reveal that these regions respond to the degree of relatedness among similar items, and implicate perceptual and constructive processes in gist-based false memory.

Recent neuroimaging work has demonstrated that the hippocampus is engaged when imagining the future, in some cases more than when remembering the past. It is possible that this hippocampal activation reflects recombining details into coherent scenarios and/or the encoding of these scenarios into memory for later use. However, inconsistent findings have emerged from recent studies of future simulation in patients with memory loss and hippocampal damage. Thus, it remains an open question as to whether the hippocampus is necessary for future simulation. In this review, we consider the findings from patient studies and the neuroimaging literature with respect to a new framework that highlights three component processes of simulation: accessing episodic details, recombining details, and encoding simulations. We attempt to reconcile these discrepancies between neuroimaging and patient studies by suggesting that different component processes of future simulation may be differentially affected by hippocampal damage.

Previous evidence has suggested a functional-anatomic dissociation between conscious and nonconscious processing during retrieval where early visual regions BA17/18 are associated with nonconscious processing and late visual regions BA19/37 are associated with conscious processing. However, evidence for this dissociation has only been observed using a limited number of experimental paradigms. In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we tested the hypothesis that conscious processing during retrieval can occur in BA17/18 using memorial paradigms that recruited processing in these early visual regions. During the encoding phase of Experiment 1, abstract shapes with colored and oriented internal lines were presented to the left and right of fixation. During the retrieval phase, old shapes and new shapes were presented at fixation and participants classified each item as “old-left”, “old-right”, or “new”. The contrast of spatial memory-hits>spatial memory-misses (with accurate item memory) produced activity in BA17/18. During the encoding phase of Experiment 2, abstract shapes with colored and oriented internal lines were presented at fixation. During the retrieval phase, old shapes, changed shapes (with the same outline but different colored and oriented internal lines), and new shapes were presented at fixation and participants made an old-new classification during runs with a specific retrieval orientation or a non-specific retrieval orientation. Critically, the contrast of old-hits>old-misses during specific retrieval orientation produced activity in BA17/18. The results of the present experiments support the hypothesis that conscious processing during retrieval can occur in BA17/18.

People frequently imagine specific interpersonal experiences that might occur in their futures. The present study used a novel experimental paradigm to examine the influence of repeated simulation of future interpersonal experiences on subjective assessments of plausibility for positive, negative, and neutral events. The results demonstrate that repeated simulation increases estimates of plausibility for emotional, but not neutral, future interpersonal experiences. Additional correlational analyses reveal that increases in plausibility for emotional events are associated with concurrent increases in ease of simulation, event detail, and arousal. Implications for daily life and affective disorders such as depression and anxiety are noted.

When people revisit previous experiences, they often engage in episodic counterfactual thinking: mental simulations of alternative ways in which personal past events could have occurred. The present study employed a novel experimental paradigm to examine the influence of repeated simulation on the perceived plausibility of upward, downward, and neutral episodic counterfactual thoughts. Participants were asked to remember negative, positive, and neutral autobiographical memories. One week later, they self-generated upward, downward, and neutral counterfactual alternatives to those memories. The following day, they resimulated each of those counterfactuals either once or four times. The results indicate that repeated simulation of upward, downward, and neutral episodic counterfactual events decreases their perceived plausibility while increasing ratings of the ease, detail, and valence of the simulations. This finding suggests a difference between episodic counterfactual thoughts and other kinds of self-referential simulations. Possible implications of this finding for pathological and nonpathological anxiety are discussed.

One of the key goals of memory research is to develop a basic understanding of the nature and characteristics of memory processes and systems. Another important goal is to develop useful applications of basic research to everyday life. This editorial considers two lines of work that illustrate some of the prospects for applying memory research to everyday life: interpolated quizzing to enhance learning in educational settings, and specificity training to enhance memory and associated functions in individuals who have difficulties remembering details of their past experiences.

Imagining or simulating future events has been shown to activate the anterior right hippocampus (RHC) more than remembering past events does. One fundamental difference between simulation and memory is that imagining future scenarios requires a more extensive constructive process than remembering past experiences does. Indeed, studies in which this constructive element is reduced or eliminated by “pre-imagining” events in a prior session do not report differential RHC activity during simulation. In this fMRI study, we examined the effects of repeatedly simulating an event on neural activity. During scanning, participants imagined 60 future events; each event was simulated three times. Activation in the RHC showed a significant linear decrease across repetitions, as did other neural regions typically associated with simulation. Importantly, such decreases in activation could not be explained by non-specific linear time-dependent effects, with no reductions in activity evident for the control task across similar time intervals. Moreover, the anterior RHC exhibited significant functional connectivity with the whole-brain network during the first, but not second and third simulations of future events. There was also evidence of a linear increase in activity across repetitions in right ventral precuneus, right posterior cingulate and left anterior prefrontal cortex, which may reflect source recognition and retrieval of internally generated contextual details. Overall, our findings demonstrate that repeatedly imagining future events has a decremental effect on activation of the hippocampus and many other regions engaged by the initial construction of the simulation, possibly reflecting the decreasing novelty of simulations across repetitions, and therefore is an important consideration in the design of future studies examining simulation.

In recent years, cognitive and educational psychologists have become interested in applying principles of cognitive psychology to education. Here, we discuss the importance of understanding the nature and occurrence of mind wandering in the context of classroom and online lectures. In reviewing the relevant literature, we begin by considering early studies that provide important clues about student attentiveness via dependent measures such as physical markers of inattention, note taking, and retention. We then provide a broad overview of studies that have directly measured mind wandering in the classroom and online learning environments. Finally, we conclude by discussing interventions that might be effective at curbing the occurrence of mind wandering in educational settings, and consider various avenues of future research that we believe can shed light on this well-known but little studied phenomenon.

During the past few years, there has been a dramatic increase in research examining the role of memory in imagination and future thinking. This work has revealed striking similarities between remembering the past and imagining or simulating the future, including the finding that a common brain network underlies both memory and imagination. Here we discuss a number of key points that have emerged during recent years, focusing in particular on the importance of distinguishing between temporal and non-temporal factors in analyses of memory and imagination, the nature of differences between remembering the past and imagining the future, the identification of component processes that comprise the default network supporting memory- based simulations, and the finding that this network can couple flexibly with other networks to support complex goal-directed simulations. This growing area of research has broadened our conception of memory by highlighting the many ways in which memory supports adaptive functioning.