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Baggott, Erin Ashley

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    Three Essays on U.S. - China Relations
    (2016-05-18) Baggott, Erin Ashley; Simmons, Beth A.; Johnston, A. Iain; Spirling, Arthur
    My dissertation argues that the United States and China employ diplomacy to secure international cooperation, but that their domestic politics render it more elusive. International relations theory regards talk as cheap. It argues that states cannot employ verbal communication to overcome structural conditions that ostensibly favor conflict. Can a security-seeking state use diplomacy to affect another’s assessment of shared interests and elicit substantive cooperation? To answer this question, my first paper analyzes original datasets of US-China diplomatic exchanges and American assessments of shared interests with China. I find that, as diplomats have long observed, diplomacy is a forum for states to exchange concessions that render both sides better off. Chinese diplomacy improves American assessments of shared interests and increases the probability of bilateral cooperation. My second paper develops a theory of diversionary aggression in autocracies. When rent transfers to political elites decline, leadership challenges become more likely. Autocrats may inoculate themselves against these challenges by courting popular support with diversionary foreign policy and nationalist propaganda. Using original data on elite transfers, diplomatic interactions, and propaganda from China, I find broad support for the theory. As much as 40% of China’s conflict initiation toward the United States appears to be diversionary. My third paper argues that American congressional politics reduce the president’s ability to secure international cooperation. Using an original dataset of legislative hostility toward China, I find that when Congress introduces legislation hostile to China, China penalizes the president by reducing its willingness to cooperate by a factor of four. Most broadly, these results suggest that the benefits accorded to democracies in international relations may be circumscribed under some conditions.