Person: Musacchio, Aldo
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Musacchio
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Aldo
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Musacchio, Aldo
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Publication These Are the Good Old Days: Foreign Entry and the Mexican Banking System(2013-01-23) Haber, Stephen; Musacchio, AldoIn 1997, the Mexican government reversed long-standing policies and allowed foreign banks to purchase Mexico’s largest commercial banks and relaxed restrictions on the founding of new, foreign-owned banks. The result has been a dramatic shift in the ownership structure of Mexico’s banks. For instance, while in 1991 only one percent of bank assets in Mexico were foreign owned, today they control 74 percent of assets. In no other country in the world has the penetration of foreign banks been as rapid or as far-reaching as in Mexico. In this work we examine some of the important implications of foreign bank entry for social welfare in Mexico. Did liberalization lead to an increase (or decrease) in the supply of credit? Did liberalization lead to an increase (or decrease) in the cost of credit? Did liberalization lead to an increase (or decrease) in the stability of the banking system? In order to answer these questions, we must first ask, “increase (or decrease), measured on what basis?” There are, in fact, two distinct conceptual frameworks through which one can assess the impact of foreign bank entry. One is concerned with measuring the short-run impacts of foreign entry on credit abundance, pricing, and observable stability using reduced form regressions. The other is an institutional economics conception of how to measure performance. It is focused on understanding whether foreign entry gave rise to difficult-to-reverse changes in the political economy of bank regulation, which will affect competition and stability in the long term, outside the period that may be observed empirically. We employ both conceptions in this paper.Publication What Do State-Owned Development Banks Do? Evidence from BNDES, 2002–09(Elsevier, 2015) Lazzarini, Sergio G.; Musacchio, Aldo; Bandeira-de-Mello, Rodrigo; Marcon, RosileneDefendants of state-owned development banks emphasize their role in reducing capital constraints and fostering productive investment; detractors point out that they may benefit politically connected capitalists or bail out inefficient firms. We study the effect of loans and equity investments of the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) and find that they do not have any consistent effect on firm-level performance and investment, except for a reduction in financial expenditures due to the subsidies accompanying loans. However, BNDES does not systematically lend to underperforming firms. Our results indicate that BNDES subsidizes firms that could fund their projects with other sources of capital.Publication Governments as Owners: State-Owned Multinational Companies(Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) Cuervo-Cazurra, Alvaro; Inkpen, Andrew; Musacchio, Aldo; Ramaswamy, KannanThe globalization of state-owned multinational companies (SOMNCs) has become an important phenomenon in international business (IB), yet it has received scant attention in the literature. We explain how the analysis of SOMNCs can help advance the literature by extending our understanding of state-owned firms (SOEs) and multinational companies (MNCs) in at least two ways. First, we cross-fertilize the IB and SOEs literatures in their analysis of foreign investment behavior and introduce two arguments: the extraterritoriality argument, which helps explain how the MNC dimension of SOMNCs extends the SOE literature, and the non-business internationalization argument, which helps explain how the SOE dimension of SOMNCs extends the MNC literature. Second, we analyze how the study of SOMNCs can help develop new insights of theories of firm behavior. In this respect, we introduce five arguments: the triple agency conflict argument in agency theory; the owner risk argument in transaction costs economics; the advantage and disadvantage of ownership argument in the resource-based view (RBV); the power escape argument in resource dependence theory; and the illegitimate ownership argument in neoinstitutional theory. After our analysis, we introduce the papers in the special issue that, collectively, reflect diverse and sophisticated research interest in the topic of SOMNCs.Publication Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State Capitalism and their Implications for Economic Performance(2012-07-13) Musacchio, Aldo; Lazzarini, Sergio G.In this paper we document the extent and reach of state capitalism around the world and explore its economic implications. We focus on governmental provision of capital to corporations – either equity or debt – as a defining feature of state capitalism. We present a stylized distinction between two broad, general varieties of state capitalism: one through majority control of publicly traded companies (e.g. state-controlled SOEs) and a hybrid form that relies on minority investments in companies by development banks, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and the government itself. We label these two alternative modes Leviathan as a majority investor and Leviathan as a minority investor, respectively. Next we differentiate between these two modes by describing their key fundamental traits and the conditions that should make each mode more conducive to development and superior economic performance.Publication Mexico's financial crisis of 1994-1995(2012-07-13) Musacchio, AldoThis paper explains the causes leading to the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995 (known as "The Tequila Crisis"), and its short- and long-term consequences. It argues that excessive enthusiasm on the part of foreign investors, not based on Mexico's fundamentals, and weak regulation of the banking system built the vulnerabilities that left Mexico exposed to a sudden change in investor appetite for Mexican securities in 1994. Political violence in Mexico and changes in monetary policy in the United States then led to radical changes in investor perceptions of the future of the country and to a balance of payments and banking crisis. The paper then explains how the crisis unraveled and describes the US bailout of the Mexican government in 1995. Since the exchange rate crisis of December of 1994 then translated into a banking crisis in 1995, the chapter ends examining the subsequent development of the Mexican banking system.Publication In Strange Company: The Puzzle of Private Investment in State-Controlled Firms(2013-02-19) Pargendler, Mariana; Musacchio, Aldo; Lazzarini, Sergio G.A large legal and economic literature describes how state-owned enterprises (SOEs) suffer from a variety of agency and political problems. Less theory and evidence, however, have been generated about the reasons why state-owned enterprises listed in stock markets manage to attract investors to buy their shares (and bonds). In this Article, we examine this apparent puzzle and develop a theory of how legal and extralegal constraints allow mixed enterprises to solve some of these problems. We then use three detailed case studies of state-owned oil companies – Brazil’s Petrobras, Norway’s Statoil, and Mexico’s Pemex – to examine how our theory fares in practice. Overall, we show how mixed enterprises have made progress to solve some of their agency problems, even as government intervention persists as the biggest threat to private minority shareholders in these firms.