Person:

Viterna, Jocelyn

Increasing levels of democratic freedoms should, in theory, improve women’s access to political positions. Yet studies demonstrate that democracy does little to improve women’s legislative representation. To resolve this paradox, we investigate how variations in the democratization process—including pre-transition legacies, historical experiences with elections, the global context of transition, and post-transition democratic freedoms and quotas—affect women’s representation in developing nations. We find that democratization’s effect is curvilinear. Women in non-democratic regimes often have high levels of legislative representation but little real political power. When democratization occurs, women’s representation initially drops, but with increasing democratic freedoms and additional elections, it increases again. The historical context of transition further moderates these effects. Prior to 1995, women’s representation increased most rapidly in countries transitioning from civil strife—but only when accompanied by gender quotas. After 1995 and the Beijing Conference on Women, the effectiveness of quotas becomes more universal, with the exception of post- communist countries. In these nations, quotas continue to do little to improve women’s representation. Our results, based on pooled time series analysis from 1975 to 2009, demonstrate that it is not democracy—as measured by a nation’s level of democratic freedoms at a particular moment in time—but rather the democratization process that matters for women’s legislative representation.

Throughout the past decade, governments across Latin America have experienced an unprecedented swing to the left. In this essay, I ask: Does the rise of the Left promote women's equality? Or in contrast, could women's continued subordination be an important factor promoting the rise of the Left? Using the case of El Salvador, I demonstrate how the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) deradicalized its public image—away from “guerrilla insurgents” and toward a viable political party—at least in part by converting its 1980s support for reproductive rights into present-day support for one of the most restrictive abortion policies in the world. I conclude that reversing the causal question about gender and left-leaning political parties may not only extend our understanding of the complicated relationship between gender and the Left but also improve our understanding of the factors moving Latin America from right to left, and from “red” to “pink.”

There is a rich collection of case studies examining the relationship between democratization, women's movements, and gendered state outcomes, but the variation across cases is still poorly understood. In response, this article develops a theoreticallygrounded comparative framework to evaluate and explain cross-national variations in the gendered outcomes of democratic transitions. The framework highlights four theoretical factors—the context of the transition, the legacy of women's previous mobilizations, political parties, and international influences—that together shape the political openings and ideologies available to women's movements in transitional states. Applying the framework to four test cases, we conclude that women's movements are most effective at targeting democratizing states when transitions are complete, when women's movements develop cohesive coalitions, when the ideology behind the transition (rather than the ideology of the winning regime) aligns easily with feminist frames, and when women's past activism legitimates present-day feminist demands. These findings challenge current conceptualizations of how democratic transitions affect gender in state institutions and provide a comparative framework for evaluating variation across additional cases.

Most studies find that the substantial cross-national variation in women's legislative representation is not explained by cross-national differences in socioeconomic development. By contrast, this note demonstrates that economic development does matter. Rather than looking for across-the-board general effects, we follow Matland (1998), and analyze developed and developing nations separately. We find that accepted explanations fit rich nations better than poor nations, and obscure the effects of democracy on women's representation in the developing world. We call for new theoretical models that better explain women's political representation within developing nations, and we suggest that democracy should be central to future models.

Female participation in the Latin American paid labor force is increasing dramatically. Building upon Portes and Hoffman's (2003) model, we use occupational data to measure gendered changes in Latin America's class structure over the last two decades of economic restructuring and adjustment and to investigate the causes and consequences of these regional patterns. Our results suggest two important conclusions. First, economic adjustment and restructuring is increasing women's parity with men in terms of class position largely as a consequence of the deterioration of men's once-privileged location in the class structure. Second, recent economic adjustment and restructuring has altered power relations between social classes in Latin America in part because it has inspired both qualitative and quantitative changes in the gendered composition of Latin American labor. The number of women entering the work force, and the labor conditions suffered particularly by women workers, has resulted in both the literal and figurative "emasculation" of the Formal Proletariat. These preliminary findings make clear the explanatory benefits of including gender in analyses of changes in the Latin American class structure.

Using qualitative comparative analysis, we examine why left-libertarian parties, associated with environmental and other "new social movements," have been relatively successful in some western democracies but not others. We conceptualize the parties as products of new citizen demands on the one hand, and of political opportunity structures, which govern party supply, on the other. We show that supply-side factors, such as a strong left and the existence of proportional representation, tend to work together to facilitate party innovation. A strong left appears more likely to downplay left-libertarian issues and push new-left activists to form separate parties, while proportional representation eases entry into the party system. Demand-side factors play a significant but lesser role. The theoretical and methodological strategies employed here have the potential to help political sociologists explain the variable success of other types of party innovators.

At the close of World War II, “development” evolved along two distinct paths. On the first, scholars aimed to generate theoretical understandings of social change, especially at the national level (development studies). On the second, policy makers in governments and other development-­focused organizations initiated actions to promote positive social change (development practice). In this article, we review the recent trajectory of development scholarship in sociology, paying close attention to the intersections between development studies and development practice. Through explicit comparisons to development scholarship in economics and political science, we demonstrate how the prominence of development sociology has varied historically in relation to its proposed policy prescriptions. We conclude by highlighting six uniquely sociological contributions that could powerfully extend contemporary interdisciplinary development conversations, and by calling for greater sociological attention to the complex ways in which a growing transnational field of development practitioners is shaping a multiplicity of development outcomes.