Person: Foote, Christopher
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Publication Labor Market Polarization Over the Business Cycle
(2014) Foote, Christopher; Ryan, RichardJob losses in the Great Recession were concentrated among middle-skill workers, the same group that has suffered the most over the long-run from automation and international trade. How might long-run occupational polarization be related to cyclical changes in middle-skill employment? We find that middle-skill jobs have traditionally been more cyclical than other jobs, in part because of the volatile industries that tend to employ middle-skill workers. Also, unemployed middle-skill workers appear to have few attractive or feasible employment alternatives outside of their skill class, and the drop in male participation rates during the past several decades can be explained in part by a drying-up of middle-skill job opportunities. Taken together, these results imply that any model relating polarization to middle-skill employment fluctuations must go beyond pure search motives to include industry-level effects as well as a labor force participation margin. The results thus provide encouragement for a growing literature that integrates “macro-labor” search models with “macro-macro” models featuring differential industry cyclicalities and convex preferences over consumption and leisure.
Publication Why Did So Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad Decisions? The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis
(Russell Sage Foundation, 2012) Foote, Christopher; Gerardi, Kristopher S.; Willen, Paul S.We present 12 facts about the mortgage crisis. We argue that the facts refute the popular story that the crisis resulted from finance industry insiders deceiving uninformed mortgage borrowers and investors. Instead, we argue that borrowers and investors made decisions that were rational and logical given their ex post overly optimistic beliefs about house prices. We then show that neither institutional features of the mortgage market nor financial innovations are any more likely to explain those distorted beliefs than they are to explain the Dutch tulip bubble 400 years ago. Economists should acknowledge the limits of our understanding of asset price bubbles and design policies accordingly.