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Harris, Paul

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Harris

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Harris, Paul

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Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Publication

    The Development of Reasoning About Beliefs: Fact, Preference, and Ideology

    (Elsevier BV, 2013) Heiphetz, Larisa; Spelke, Elizabeth; Harris, Paul; Banaji, Mahzarin

    The beliefs people hold about the social and physical world are central to self-definition and social interaction. The current research analyzes reasoning about three kinds of beliefs: those that concern matters of fact (e.g., dinosaurs are extinct), preference (e.g., green is the prettiest color), and ideology (e.g., there is only one God). The domain of ideology is of unique interest because it is hypothesized to contain elements of both facts and preferences. If adults' distinct reasoning about ideological beliefs is the result of prolonged experience with the physical and social world, children and adults should reveal distinct patterns of differentiating kinds of beliefs, and this difference should be particularly pronounced with respect to ideological beliefs. On the other hand, if adults' reasoning about beliefs is a basic component of social cognition, children and adults should demonstrate similar belief representations and patterns of belief differentiation. Two experiments demonstrate that 5–10 year old children and adults similarly judged religious beliefs to be intermediate between factual beliefs (where two disagreeing people cannot both be right) and preferences (where they can). From the age of 5 years and continuing into adulthood, individuals distinguished ideological beliefs from other types of mental states and demonstrated limited tolerance for belief-based disagreements.

  • Publication

    What do different beliefs tell us? An examination of factual, opinion-based, and religious beliefs

    (Elsevier, 2014) Heiphetz, Larisa; Spelke, Elizabeth; Harris, Paul; Banaji, Mahzarin

    Children and adults differentiate statements of religious belief from statements of fact and opinion, but the basis of that differentiation remains unclear. Across three experiments, adults and 8–10-year-old children heard statements of factual, opinion-based, and religious belief. Adults and children judged that statements of factual belief revealed more about the world, statements of opinion revealed more about individuals, and statements of religious belief provided information about both. Children—unlike adults—judged that statements of religious belief revealed more about the world than the believer. These results led to three conclusions. First, judgments concerning the relative amount of information statements of religious belief provide about individuals change across development, perhaps because adults have more experience with diversity. Second, recognizing that statements of religious belief provide information about both the world and the believer does not require protracted learning. Third, statements of religious belief are interpreted as amalgams of factual and opinion-based statements.