Essays on Systemic Theories of Conflict

Abstract

Structural theories of international politics are in decline in recent years. One factor driv- ing the decline is a conceptual confusion between international system and international structure. International system consists of structure and its constituent units; international structure is the context in which the units interact. Confusing international system with inter- national structure leads to an often unfounded fear of reductionism, which has discouraged analysts from specifying clear mechanisms that link systemic forces to concrete changes in policy maker attitudes, public opinion, and ultimately foreign policy. Consequently, existing systemic theories often have little explanatory power. This dissertation consists of three essays that are unified by their commitment to studying structural drivers of conflict from the "bottom up". All three essays take care to specify the rationalist and psychological micro-foundations driving structural arguments, before deriving concrete hypotheses regarding the individual- and national- level observable implications of those arguments; I study the forest by examining the trees. Substantively, each essay of my dissertation engages one of "master" variables in the structural analysis of politics – hierarchy, interdependence, and distribution of capabilities – to study conflict. The first essay investigates why status-driven actors who seek to establish or preserve a hierarchy will not bargain. Building on a body of work in dispute resolution and social psychology, I argue that bargaining corrodes social hierarchy. Consequently, status-driven actors pay a social cost to bargain. With a simple model that endogenizes the timing of negotiation, I show that status-driven actors will not bargain even if the associated social cost is minor relative to the potential gains from bargaining. This is because their opponent cannot credibly commit not to leverage the costliness of renegotiation and push the status-driven actors to make excessive concessions (if they negotiate). The second essay examines the psychology of globalization and its implications for the evolution of international social structure. Does globalization promote mutual under- standing or does it intensify mistrust among nations? I argue that, contrary to popular conception, transnational social linkages lead individuals to mistrust foreign nations. In a globalized world, individuals often find it difficult to sustain the belief that their national community is distinct. To preserve their sense of distinctiveness, individuals tend to deni- grate foreign nations and endorse the belief that international politics are conflictual rather than cooperative. The third essay argues that preponderance of power encourages warmongering and breeds fear among the citizens of a powerful nation. As a country becomes more powerful ? either due to an uneven rate of growth or the failure of other countries to form a counter- balancing coalition ? its citizens will become more confident regarding conflict outcome. Consequently, under broad conditions, the citizens are likely to dedicate less time and effort to evaluating any tales of foreign threat propagated by the state. Knowing that the citizens are now less attentive, it would be more likely for the state to propagate ?alternative facts? regarding a foreign threat for its own benefits, which the citizens would accept. In sum, the dissertation argues that diplomacy is ineffective when actors fight for status, interdependence breeds fear, and countries become more insecure as they rise in power.