The Military Kleptocracy of Egypt – Gatekeeper and Saboteur: An Assessment of Egypt’s Deteriorating Economic Terms of Trade and Strategies for Coping and Reform

Abstract

Egypt has two living former Presidents. One is in prison, the other, in his late eighties, only recently released. Vigorous and assured, each of these men seized power in a violent coup or assassination and, in turn, were unceremoniously disgorged themselves. To be sure, قصر رئاسة الجمهورية is not an easy place to ascend, its imperium is not lightly bestowed. Egypt, long the frontispiece of Arabic world, the Middle East and Africa, stands as a complex geography. This analysis seeks to link Egypt’s gangrenous corruption vis a vis military involvement with its implacable economic woes and discuss strategies for how Egypt can reform itself. That increased economic prosperity and stability will cultivate political stability is an underlying premise, though one assessed and validated with empirical analysis. To test its thesis, four important premises are explored: (i) Egypt’s economy is challenged/ suffering; (ii) The military is involved and exacerbating Egypt’s economic woes; (iii) Egypt’s economy has political relevance; and (iv) The regime instability from Egypt’s economic precariousness can lead to both national and regional security issues. Thus, the overarching structure will have five pillars: (1) Egypt’s economic overview, including statistics (and how Egypt’s economic peril has become a national security crisis, or at least, triggered political peril); (2) the reasons for Egypt’s failure, weakness and tailspin, both historically and currently; (3) Egypt’s military industrial complex (its depth and havoc), including some discussion of not only Egypt but how Egypt’s military overreach/ expropriation can be ‘business-as-usual’ in Egypt’s peer countries (ie regional neighbors); (4) solutions to ameliorate Egypt’s condition; and (5) prospective benefits from reform for Egypt and its neighbors. This does not confine itself to Egypt’s military (though it is essential to discuss their critical role and Egypt’s “strong state” orientation) because their entrenchment is well-known and, in a certain way, impossible to ultimately prove (or get the documentation that irrefutably and precisely quantifies the impact of their corruption). While an acknowledgement of the military’s unchecked interference in Egypt is problematic (and even more insidious than Egypt-watchers and the pundits/analysts may appreciate), this analysis accepts that the military’s meddling is going to be difficult to remove. In that sense, the military’s presence could be assessed as a tax or a constraint (though, in its current asphyxiating form, this presence is untenable). Thus, any discussion of solutions, reforms or coping mechanisms will strive for pragmatism within these parameters.