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Air Power in the Face of Ethnic Cleansing: The Effectiveness of NATO’s Approach to End Serbian Aggression in Kosovo

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2021-05-14

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Willey, Jonathan Brent. 2021. Air Power in the Face of Ethnic Cleansing: The Effectiveness of NATO’s Approach to End Serbian Aggression in Kosovo. Master's thesis, Harvard University Division of Continuing Education.

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) decision to use air power alone in the Kosovo Conflict against Serbian aggression to restore political stability and end ethnic cleansing. Through historical analysis and evidence, this thesis illustrates that NATO’s air power alone strategy in Kosovo was the most influential and effective option as opposed to other uses of military power to bring Serbian aggressors to the negotiation table. Relevant primary and secondary sources have been used to examine evidence to draw conclusions and justify NATO’s decision to use air power alone in Kosovo and to expose the effectiveness of air power alone in meeting military objectives and political aims among different conflicts. I apply Process Tracing (PT) to substantiate the effectiveness of air power alone as the most influential and effective use in Kosovo while ruling out other military force alternatives. Lastly, I address the rejection by some scholars and military theorists that the use of air power alone in Kosovo was not effective enough to curb ethnic cleansing and save lives with greater expediency. I compare Operation Allied Force (OAF) in Kosovo to other similar uses of air power alone operations: Operation Deliberate Force (ODF) and Operation Unified Protector (OUP) to expose the advantages, disadvantages, and lessons learned, while using Operation Desert Storm (ODS) as a paradigm shift in air power doctrine leading to the adoption of “Effects Based Operations.” This comparison and analysis provides evidence to support the argument through PT regarding whether or not air power alone in Kosovo was effective. To provide historical context, I address the underlying political tensions of the Balkan region through an analysis of focus areas including the support of United States allies support and the public, inherent battlefield challenges, and humanitarian concerns. Similar air power alone cases provide additional insight and details into these criteria, identifying common trends associated with the use of air power alone and highlighting the advantages, disadvantages, and lessons learned unique to each operation. Overall, air power alone in the Kosovo Conflict was the most effective use of military force and led to the end of Serbian aggression within 78 days, a significant milestone given the challenges and limitations NATO aircrews encountered conducting air operations in the Balkans. NATO’s actions during the Kosovo Conflict demonstrate the capacity for air power alone to succeed in accomplishing military objectives and political aims.

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International relations

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