Essays on the Politics of Security Linkages in International Relations

Abstract

Security has been regarded as the bedrock of high politics by international relations scholars. As it is treated as the central concern for states in an anarchical international system, it is important to study the politics of creating security linkages in carrying out international relations. The first paper especially focuses on national security linkages made to issues of international trade. That is, when do politicians link security and trade? I specifically analyze congressional floor speeches made directly in relation to trade agreement bills from the 96th to 112th Congress. I find that more conservative legislators and those who are copartisans with the sitting president are more likely to invoke security during their trade speeches. Moreover, speeches that were about trade agreement with allies as well as those given in more conflictual security environments were associated with greater security topic content. The results have important implications for the study of domestic political processes that shape the nexus between geopolitics, security, and international trade.

The second paper examines the effect that national security frames have on foreign policy preferences. While security linkages to traditionally non-military issues have been thought to be effective in mobilizing the public, the underlying psychological assumptions have been undertested. Using a conjoint experiment, I show that security frames are no more effective than economic and human rights frames in swaying the public opinion on foreign policies. Moreover, the effects of security frames are neutralized by counterframes, not unlike other frames. The results have important implications for the study of securitization, framing, and public opinion.

The final paper in this dissertation, co-authored with Christina Davis and Diana Stanescu, focuses on the institutional linkages created between geopolitics and trade. Specifically, we examine the design of trade bureaucracies of all WTO members and evaluate both the conditions that affect the design choice and its impact on trade-security linkages. We find that states' internationalist orientation, peaceful security context, and parliamentary systems are associated with greater likelihood of foreign affairs ministry as opposed to industrial ministry leading on trade. We also find that states with foreign ministry led trade bureaucracies are more likely to form PTAs that extend beyond existing military alliance networks and selectively add security provisions to the economic agreements.