Grey Zone Tactics as Catalysts for Balancing Coalitions: A Level of Analysis Approach

Abstract

This paper frames the efficacy of grey zone tactics and their ability to trigger balancing coalitions as a level of analysis question. External players usually analyze People’s Republic of China (PRC) grey zone tactics through either a rational actor model, assuming a monolithic government maximizing national interest, or through the primacy of an individual leader. The PRC Government, by contrast, describes its own actions purely as a reaction to the state of the international environment. All three approaches imply significant centralization of control. If this centralization exists, whole-of-society efforts will be more effective. If it exists in perception only, these analytical structures limit the ability of external players to formulate effective responses. The United States is understood as a complex set of competing interests, in line with Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM). This reduces efficacy of whole-of-society efforts given coordination problems and creates a larger attack surface for external parties to target disruptive actions. A BPM approach identifies tactics that trigger the balancing coalitions long forecast by grey zone theorists by allowing greater delineation between the different bureaucratic actors impacted. Case studies illustrate four contributors to catalytic impact inclusive of a strategic or intrinsic domestic interest at stake and a single narrative consistent with current and historical understanding of an issue.