Attack on Politicians: The Impact of Political Assassinations on Tough-on-Crime Policies and Urban Development in Mexico

Abstract

Ever since President Calderón launched the War on Drugs policy in Mexico in 2006 by sending in more than 6,500 troops to his home state of Michoacán, there have been a series of political assassinations against local politicians by drug cartels in retaliation for stringent public security measures. My thesis seeks to understand whether politicians increase or decrease tough-on-crime policy measures when faced with the prospect of political assassination. Using a staggered difference-in-difference method, I find that assassinations from 2010-2018 decreased police presence by approximately 19 police officers per 100,000 population, and these effects persist up to 4 years. Assassinations are associated with an increase in cartel violence by approximately 7 percentage points, suggesting that assassinations are an effective way of increasing cartel presence. The decrease in police presence is more modest in areas of low socioeconomic status and increases in public security infrastructure are more prominent in areas of high socioeconomic status. These changes imply that municipalities with limited budgets are unable to invest in public security infrastructures, demonstrating that politicians’ responses to assassinations depend on resource constraints. Overall, my analysis suggests that politicians cave into cartel demands, which increases cartel violence, indicating the need to increase protection and accountability measures for politicians.