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Elite Persistence in Old Babylonian Nippur & Ur (2026-1700 BCE)

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2026-06-05

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Deloucas, Andrew Alberto Nicolas. 2026. Elite Persistence in Old Babylonian Nippur & Ur (2026-1700 BCE). Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.

Abstract

This dissertation investigates the phenomenon of elite persistence in the Mesopotamian city-states of Nippur and Ur during the Old Babylonian period (2026–1700 BCE). Decentering this period from its traditional king‑centered histoire événementielle, I develop a prosopography database of more than 13,000 attestations and conduct medium-scale archival analysis of 2,500 texts to examine how the local elites of these two cities utilized institutions to perpetuate themselves across three centuries of political change. Whereas Nippur maintained a degree of autonomy after the Great Revolt in 1742 BCE, Ur took greater political risk in aligning with the rebellion. Comparative case studies of Assur and Sippar are incorporated to provide a framework for understanding how other Mesopotamian cities negotiated state engagement with locally governed institutions. This study demonstrates that social power in the Middle Bronze Age was a collective, negotiable process and far less autocratic than royal documentation suggests. Although kings claimed de jure power, local organizations and households exercised de facto power through their economic and legal institutions and the social networks embedded with them. City-state autonomy therefore depended on how elite networks navigated critical junctures during transitions in state power or periods of regional conflict. Cities whose institutions limited state interaction fared differently than those that benefitted from close economic ties to the state. In this way, institutional strategies of elites can explain how Middle Bronze Age cities confronted moments of risk and why some cities could be relatively stable while others chose to rebel.

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Babylonia, Bronze Age, Mesopotamia, Old Babylonian Period, Southwest Asia, Sumer, Ancient history, Economic history, Ancient languages

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