Knowledge, Action, and the Ultimate Goal of Human Life: A Hindu-Muslim Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion in the Early Modern Era: Gadādhara (d.1660) and Mullā Ṣadrā (d.1635)

Abstract

This dissertation focuses on a specific inquiry within the writings of two 17th-century philosophers: Gadādhara (d. 1660) and Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1635). The question under investigation is the roles that knowledge and action play in the process leading to the ultimate end of human life. The dissertation seeks to determine which of the two—knowledge or ritual action—serves as the primary cause of the ultimate end, and which one assumes a secondary and subordinate role. Additionally, it explores the interconnection between the two and investigates how the acquisition of one is conditioned and dependent on the other. In the Islamic context, the dissertation explores how in the latter half of the 14th century, the Sufi concept of self-annihilation in God (fanā') gradually became integrated into the Islamic discourse on akhlāq (philosophical ethics). Prior to this development, treatises on akhlāq primarily aimed to guide individuals in acquiring the virtue of justice ('adālah) through the attainment of wisdom, courage, and modesty. In the new Sufi-influenced perspective, 'adālah serves as a stepping stone towards attaining fanā'. While Ṣadrā embraced this view, he further emphasized the noetic dimension of fanā' as witnessing divine oneness (tawḥīd). Subsequently, this study examines how the addition of fanā’ as a noetic state contributes to Ṣadrā’s understanding of the role of knowledge and ritual action in the attainment of happiness (sa‘ādah). In the Hindu context, the main focus of this study surrounds what is known as jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vāda, that is, the debate on the causal role that knowledge and action play in effecting the ultimate goal of human life, liberation (mokṣa). It examines how Gadādhara’s view on the topic developed out of debates among Nyāya philosophers. Gaṅgeśa (fl. 14th c.) defines liberation as the absence of suffering, comparing it to the absence of a pot after it is broken. However, Rāmabhadra Sarvabhauma (fl. 16th c.) argues that liberation is not merely the absence of suffering but a state of pleasure. Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa (d. 1640), a teacher of Gadādhara, supports Gaṅgeśa's definition of liberation as involving an absence, while adding that it is the absence of the cause of suffering, demerit. In the context of this discussion, Gadādhara explores the causal role of knowledge and action in liberation. He argues that direct knowledge of the nature of the self serves as the direct cause of liberation, but attaining this knowledge is conditioned upon ritual practice. In the comparative section of the dissertation, I delve into the insights gained from examining Gadādhara and Ṣadrā in conjunction. The primary focus is their theory of ritual actions, as I explore the factors that determine when thinking translates into motivation, determination, and subsequent action. Additionally, I tackle the issue of weak willpower and utilize their theory of ritual action to develop an understanding of situations in which a religious agent possesses the knowledge of what needs to be done, yet fails to engage in the corresponding ritual action.