Developmental Foundations of the Social Mind

Abstract

Our understanding of others’ minds is central to human learning, cooperation, and social life more broadly. In the present dissertation, I examine the development and origins of humans’ abilities to reason about others’ minds, particularly within social contexts. What concepts make up humans’ core knowledge of others’ minds? My main claim is that infants and toddlers have a skeletal understanding of the mental states that guide and inform others’ social actions. In Paper 1, I provide evidence that 3-month-old infants have knowledge of the goals underlying others’ actions, even prior to first-person experience engaging in those actions (Woo, Liu, & Spelke, in revision, Developmental Science). In Paper 2, I provide evidence that infants and toddlers leverage their understanding of others’ goals to make sense of and evaluate acts of helping (Woo & Spelke, 2023, Child Development). In Paper 3, I provide evidence that toddlers are sensitive to the beliefs and intentions underlying others’ social actions (Woo & Spelke, 2023, Developmental Science). Together, these three papers shed light on what infants and toddlers know about others’ minds, as well as how they apply this knowledge to navigate the social world. Moreover, the findings from these papers inspire questions concerning why infants and toddlers reason about others’ minds and engage in social evaluation, as well as whether and how this early-emerging knowledge gives rise to adult cognition.