A Technophilosophical Exploration of the Simulation Hypothesis and Virtual Reality Technology

Abstract

The simulation hypothesis states that we are living in a computer simulation. That is, our reality is and always has been a simulated virtual reality. Philosophers typically classify the simulation hypothesis as a radical skeptical scenario—a scenario that brings into question our ability to have certain knowledge about the real world outside our own minds. In my thesis, I argue that our epistemological evaluation of the simulation hypothesis, as a radical skeptical scenario, depends on our metaphysical intuitions. Our metaphysical intuitions are our intuitions about the nature of reality that can fall on a continuum between two paradigmatic metaphysical views: subjective idealism and realism. Although subjective idealism may better resolve the worries of radical skepticism, subjective idealism is often seen as a radical metaphysical view. My thesis—as a project in technophilosophy—explores the influences of VR technology on our understanding of the nature of reality. In my thesis, I argue that experiencing presence—the subjective feeling of "being there" in a virtual world—may lead to shifts in the user's metaphysical intuitions away from realism and towards idealism. To empirically test this hypothesis, I present a mixed-methods study that investigates the effects of presence in a VR environment on the user's metaphysical intuitions. In a study of 22 participants, I show that participants who experienced presence in a VR environment were significantly more open to and accepting of radical metaphysical views—such as subjective idealism—than participants who did not. I interpret the results from the study along three thematic aspects of metaphysical intuition: the nature of virtual reality, the subjectivity of reality, and the plurality of reality. I put forward a novel causal theory to explain the mechanism by which VR produces these effects on the user. Finally, I discuss the implications of these findings on our metaphysical understanding and our evaluation of the simulation hypothesis. Ultimately, I contribute early empirical evidence of the effects that VR may have on our philosophical understanding.