Ending the Stalemate: Iran, the United States, and the Use of Applied History to Facilitate Changes in Diplomacy

Abstract

This thesis explores the complex and adversarial relationship between the U.S. and Iran since 1979, including the impacts of sanctions, Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, regime change efforts, and alliances aimed at cooperation in the Middle East. Examining historical parallels highlights how applied history can inform diplomatic strategies. Sanctions, the primary U.S. approach toward Iran, have largely failed to influence Iranian policies and have caused significant negative effects. Historical examples, such as sanctions against Fascist Italy, reveal ineffectiveness in changing aggressive behavior. I suggest the Peace of Westphalia from 1648 as a model for creating a balanced Middle Eastern order involving major powers to reduce sectarian tensions and promote cooperation. Iran's nuclear program is crucial for its national security as a deterrent, and although Iran has not yet weaponized its capabilities, it is nearing threshold status. Therefore, I propose that Iran could use nuclear weapons to negotiate for sanctions relief, similar to South Africa's experience with its nuclear program. I also argue that political change in Iran should not rely on external military intervention, as past U.S. efforts in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan led to prolonged instability. The recommendation is that the U.S. avoid consideration of regime change as a strategy and focus on diplomatic engagement, learning from past mistakes. Analyzing historical cases reveals that a diplomatic approach with realistic negotiations offers the best path to regional stability, encouraging cooperation and mutual recognition to foster peace in the Middle East. Both nations should study history to avoid repeating errors, as understanding past conflicts helps clarify regional and ideological dynamics.