Essays on Lawmaking

Abstract

This dissertation presents four essays on lawmaking in the contemporary United States. The legislative process, far from being the domain of pure politics, is structured by law: constitutional provisions, framework statutes, cameral rules, and parliamentary precedents. My work shows the many ways in which these sources of law impact governance. They shape which substantive proposals are and are not enacted into law. They mediate between the dueling values of majority rule and minority rights. They help determine how legislators balance the needs of their constituencies against pressures from parties and interest groups. The first essay, Law Within Congress, examines parliamentary precedent in the U.S. Congress, drawing on primary source materials to show how legalist values and political realities intersect to create a body of law. The second essay, Codifying Constitutional Norms, examines the practical and theoretical stakes of enacting norms into law. The third essay, The Law of Legislative Representation, considers what duties legislative representatives have and how legal rules can incentivize or disincentivize legislators from fulfilling those duties. The fourth essay, Rethinking Swing Voters, examines how swing voters in multimember decisionmaking bodies are constructed by institutional rules and considers the normative stakes of swing voters in such bodies.