Publication: Conflict, Defense Spending, and the Number of Nations
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Date
2006
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Elsevier
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Citation
Alesina, Alberto, and Enrico Spolaore. 2006. Conflict, defense spending, and the number of nations. European Economic Review 50(1): 91-120.
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Abstract
This paper provides a formal model of endogenous border formation and choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict. We examine both the case of democratic governments and of dictatorships. The model is consistent with three observations. First, breakup of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of international conflicts. Second, the number of regional conflicts between smaller countries may increase as a result of the breakup of larger countries. Third, the size of the peace dividend (the reduction in defense spending in a more peaceful world) is limited by the process of country breakup.
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Keywords
conflict, borders, size of nations, Leviathans
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